United States Confronts China over Seizure of Unmanned Drone in the South China Sea

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 513-517 ◽  

On December 15, 2016, China seized an American unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in the South China Sea. The drone had been launched by an American naval vessel, the USNSBowditch. According to press reports, “[t]he American crew was in the process of retrieving the device when a small boat dispatched from the Chinese vessel took it as the American sailors looked on.” China has made extensive—and contested—maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, including within an area delimited by the “nine-dash line.” The incident occurred outside of this area, and none of the Chinese government's statements related to the seizure suggest any assertion of Chinese jurisdiction over the waters where the drone was seized. After an exchange of diplomatic statements, China returned the drone to the U.S. Navy.

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-349
Author(s):  
Fayokemi Ayodeji Olorundami

Abstract In July 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal handed down its award in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China. In addition to considering the legal status of the controversial nine-dash line, the Tribunal also provided the first judicial interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC, thereby shedding light on what maritime features may be regarded as islands and not rocks within the meaning of that article, and therefore entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. This article considers the decision reached by the Tribunal, and the views expressed in the literature, applying them to an analysis that attempts to answer whether the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (sovereignty over which is disputed by China and Japan) in the East China Sea would qualify as islands, and thus entitled to an EEZ and as a continental shelf, or as rocks and therefore not so entitled.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiguo Gao ◽  
Bing Bing Jia

The South China Sea has generally been a calm area of sea since ancient times. Until the late twentieth century, it had provided a fertile fishing ground for local fishermen from China and other littoral states, and a smooth route of navigation for the nations of the region and the rest of the international community. This tranquility has been disturbed, however, by two recent developments. The first was the physical occupation of the Nansha, or Spratly, Islands by some of the coastal states in the 1970s. This process continued through the rest of the century. Now, nearly all the islands and insular features within the Spratly Islands have been subjected to physical control by one littoral state or another.


Author(s):  
Nataliya Gorodnia

This paper describes and discusses the major developments in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016, between signing an agreement to extend a rent of Subic Bay Naval base by the U.S. and inauguration of R. Duterte administration. The research has revealed three periods in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016. The first period started when the Philippines senate rejected to ratify the Subic Bay Agreement in September 1991, and the United States had to evacuate the naval base on November 1992. It lasted until the U.S. and the Philippines signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1998. The Philippines government’s interest in reaching a new agreement was caused by China’s 1995 military occupation of the Panganiban reef and other incidents at the disputed territories in the South China Sea. The Philippines claimed that they composed a part of their exclusive economic zone, according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The second period lasted since ratification of the VFA by the Philippines parliament in 1999 until aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea in 2011. This period was featured by enhanced political and military cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines, and significant U.S. assistance in modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In September 2001–2006, the security cooperation was focused on the counterterrorism activitiesin the Philippines by military means. In 2007–2011, the focus shifted to humanitarian operations and development assistance. During the third period, in March 2011 – June 2016, B. Aquino administration refocused attention from domestic security issues to the threats in the South China Sea. In 2014, the Philippines and the U.S. signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provided American ships, aircrafts and military personnel with an access to several military bases of the AFP on a rotating basis. The Agreement essentially improved U.S. strategic position in the Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.


Subject Russian-Chinese naval cooperation. Significance When Chinese and Russian naval vessels came together for joint exercises last month, international worries about the wargames' location in the South China Sea were heightened by the simulated capture of islands, given Beijing's broad territorial claims to waters in the region. Impacts While Moscow may sympathise with Beijing on the South China Sea dispute, it will avoid angering other states. Military cooperation reflects a shared anti-US stance but little commonality on regional security. China sees the Russian navy as its most important foreign partner.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Stubbs ◽  
Dale Stephens

This article examines five of the most important legal issues arising from Chinese reclamation and construction in disputed areas of the South China Sea. First, does the construction have any impact on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea? Second, does the construction affect rights to maritime zones? This involves consideration of the differing legal significance of islands, rocks, low tide elevations and artificial islands, the relevance of land reclamation and construction in this context, and the resulting implications for maritime zones including territorial seas, eezs and safety zones. Third, are there other legal consequences arising from the Chinese activity (for example, on environmental grounds)? Fourth, does the construction bolster any potential ability of China to impose an Air Defence Identification Zone in the South China Sea? Fifth, what is the significance – legally and practically – of the award in the South China Sea Arbitration?


2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 975-1017
Author(s):  
Alfred W. McCoy

After four years of rising tensions over China's construction of military bases in the South China Sea, in July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a landmark decision layered with meaning, academic as well as diplomatic. “China's claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction,” wrote the panel of five judges, “with respect to the maritime areas … encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention [on the Law of the Sea] and without lawful effect.” Writing with unambiguous clarity, the court ruled that China's dredging of these artificial islands for military bases gave it no right whatsoever to the surrounding seas and rebuked Beijing for infringing on waters that the Philippines should rightly control. China's claims to most of the South China Sea within that nine-dash line, which Beijing first published on maps at the height of the Cold War in 1953 and has pursued ever since, “were extinguished,” the court said, by the UN Convention (Gao and Jia 2013, 103–4;New York Times2016; Permanent Court of Arbitration 2016, 68–77, 116–17).


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