scholarly journals Subsidy Incidence in Privately Negotiated Spot Markets: Experimental Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 219-234
Author(s):  
Mohammad Maksudur Rahman ◽  
Christopher T. Bastian ◽  
Chian Jones Ritten ◽  
Owen R. Phillips

AbstractWe use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a “subsidy” versus a schedule shift.

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale J. Menkhaus ◽  
Chris T. Bastian ◽  
Owen R. Phillips ◽  
Patrick D. O'Neill

AbstractLaboratory experimental methods are used to investigate the impacts of supply and/or demand risks on prices, quantities traded, and earnings within forward and spot market institutions. Random demand and/or supply shifts can be as much as 25 percent of the expected equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, results suggest that the spot or forward trading institution itself has a greater influence on market outcomes than the presence of risk within the trading institution. Sellers tend to have relatively higher earnings in a spot market than buyers, regardless of the risk. Total surplus, however, generally is greater in a forward market.


2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vital Anderhub ◽  
Manfred Königstein ◽  
Dorothea Kübler

Author(s):  
Erik den Hartigh

In economics and management science, there has been increasing interest in network effects and social interaction effects. Network effects occur when to an economic agent (e.g., a consumer of a firm), the utility of using a product or technology becomes larger as its network of users grows in size (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). The network effect may set in motion a positive feedback loop that will cause a product or technology to become more prevalent in the market. Social interaction effects occur when an economic agent’s preference for a product or technology is dependent upon the opinions or expectations of other economic agents. The social interaction effect may set in motion a positive feedback loop that will cause agents to expect that a certain product or technology will become more prevalent in the market. In markets, network effects and social interaction effects appear for example in the emergence of fashions and fads (e.g., Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, & Welch, 1992) and in technology adoption and standardization (e.g., Arthur, 1989; Katz et al., 1985). Theory and existing research suggest that the presence of network effects and social interaction effects in markets has important implications for market structure, for market outcomes and, as a consequence, for the behavior and the performance of firms that are active in those markets (e.g., Arthur, 1996; Schilling, 1998; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). An important question is therefore under which conditions these network effects and social interaction effects occur in markets.


2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (23) ◽  
pp. 79-96
Author(s):  
José Carlos Vera ◽  

The theory of market social economy appears neatly when dealing with environmental conservation and the search for the wellbeing of the underprivileged. These concepts have been used in various countries and today it is possible to see countries that carefully watch over their environment and have achieved signifi cant social balance. Peru has not been alien to environmental and social concepts and for more than four decades has establishes organizations, designed policies and enacted laws to look at these issues. However, the outcomes have been limited. Among the reasons that explain the ineffectiveness of such regulations and institutions perhaps among the most important are the lack of effective oversight and control over economic agents, and an ineffi cient design of the ways to attain goals through regulations and institutions. For that reason, this paper proposes policy options to correct market outcomes and a way to build institutions that will allow to accomplish the desired goals


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