scholarly journals The Political Economy of Relief Aid Allocation: Evidence from Madagascar

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 486-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathalie Francken ◽  
Bart Minten ◽  
Johan F.M. Swinnen
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Aid Allocation

The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takaaki Masaki
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Geographical Distribution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Development Projects ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Aid Allocation ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Swing Voters

Abstract:This article utilizes a newly available dataset on the geographical distribution of development projects in Zambia to test whether electoral incentives shape aid allocation at the subnational level. Based on this dataset, it argues that when political elites have limited information to target distributive goods specifically to swing voters, they allocate more donor projects to districts where opposition to the incumbent is strong, as opposed to districts where the incumbent enjoys greater popularity.

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