scholarly journals Signaling Game-Inspired Model for Ubiquitous Security in VANETs

2019 ◽  
Vol 160 ◽  
pp. 791-796
Author(s):  
Abdelfettah Mabrouk ◽  
Amiyne Zakouni ◽  
Mohammed El Koutbi
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Game

scholarly journals Strategic Defense Against Stealthy Link Flooding Attacks: A Signaling Game Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 751-764
Author(s):  
Abdullah Aydeger ◽  
Mohammad Hossein Manshaei ◽  
Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman ◽  
Kemal Akkaya
Keyword(s):  
Signaling Game ◽  
Flooding Attacks ◽  
Strategic Defense

scholarly journals Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game

2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1068-1079 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Brusse ◽  
Justin Bruner
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Signaling Game

Postscript on “The Serious Consequences of Word Games”: The Signaling Game around the “Final Opportunity” for Iraq in Security Council Resolution 1441

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 943-963
Author(s):  
Craig Scott
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
German Law ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
Signaling Game

This brief essay is intended to be read as a supplement to the article “Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games: Language, Violence and Responsibility in the Security Council,” which was published in the German Law Journal on 1 November 2002. The date of publication was exactly one week before the Security Council voted on Resolution 1441, the text of which was still evolving during the last week of October 2002. What follows is a narrative that traces the trajectory of the Resolution's textual language from the provisions of a 21 October US-UK draft to the final form as of Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted on 8 November 2002.

scholarly journals Hypothesis Testing Under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Signaling Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (19) ◽  
pp. 5169-5183
Author(s):  
Serkan Saritas ◽  
Sinan Gezici ◽  
Serdar Yuksel
Keyword(s):  
Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Signaling Game

Screening Model in Enterprise Competitive Intelligence Activity

2010 ◽  
Vol 121-122 ◽  
pp. 360-363
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu ◽  
Fang Liu ◽  
Yun Feng Luo
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Competitive Intelligence ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Screening Model ◽  
Intelligence Activity ◽  
True Type ◽  
Standard Term

The paper researched the screening model in enterprise competitive intelligence activity based on game theory. It studied the service provider’s decision in competitive intelligence(CI) project and proved it could be satisfied with Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It also revealed the heterogeneity between the service providers through a signaling game model in which signal set was the combine of CI quality standard term. The result shows that a quality standard about CI should be designed in contract which provides a signal for service provider to self-certify its own true type and is in favor of screening for enterprise.

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