Poland’s conception of European security and Russia

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał Lisiakiewicz

This article examines the problem of contemporary bilateral relations between Poland and Russia. Its thesis largely attributes the rivalry of these two states in Eastern Europe to conceptions relating to the balancing and bandwagoning of power. This rivalry can be put down to the fact that Polish-Russian relations are being developed within broader global processes such as Russia’s relations with NATO, the USA and European Union. The greatest obstacle to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations is the sensitive issue of security. In recent years Poland has consistently underlined its willingness to reinforce NATO’s mutual defense mechanisms by supporting the organization’s continued presence in Central-Eastern Europe. This issue has been compounded by Poland’s striving to bring the countries of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) into closer affiliation with Western institutions favoring European integration, which is evidently perceived as interference in what is regarded by Moscow to be a sphere of Russian influence. This has provoked a number of serious crises in bilateral relations between Poland and Russia since the Euro-Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Russian plans to install new (Iskander) missile systems close to the Polish border and Poland’s effective attempts post-2014 to extend NATO presence within its own country testify to the scale of conflicts of interest between the two states and the lack of trust afforded by both sides. The issues highlighted in this paper are of great importance, since they not only enable the complexity of Central European issues to be more fully comprehended but also help to elucidate other global actors’ conceptions relating to cooperation with Europe.

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yury E. Fedorov

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the socalled ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers’ rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO’s security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region. However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region.Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders. Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO’s security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia’s ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.


1997 ◽  
Vol 69 (9) ◽  
pp. 343-353
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Fatić

This paper deals with specific aspects of the crisis of social policy on the "central"-eastem European region, after the onset of political changes that commenced in 1989 with the so-called ..anti-communist revolutions", especially in "central" European countries. The period that began then has been characterised by fast political "transition" and restructuralisation of the economy and political institutions. It has brought with it the excitements of the "capitalisation" of the economy and society, greater individual liberties and rights. However, it has also inflicted on the region a social crisis of apocalyptic dimensions, which is truly unprecedent in this century's history of eastern Europe. The paper explores some particular elements of this social crisis, both statistically and qualitatively. These aspects of the crisis are interpreted, and in its concluding section the paper purports to suggest that any institutional and political change tends to have its more or less devastating social price, which in the case of most countries of "central"-eastern Europe could be have been lower if the reform had progressed at a more moderate and better planned pace.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Borisas Melnikas

The present state of university and professional education in Lithuania and major problems of its development are outlined. The possibilities of upgrading university and professional studies are evaluated, taking into account the processes associated with the integration of Lithuania into the European Union. In addition, the prospects of education development are analyzed in the context of transitions characteristic of the states of Central and Eastern Europe.


World Affairs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 183 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-269
Author(s):  
Pavlo Klimkin ◽  
Andreas Umland

Among various geopolitical repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic are redefinitions of the short-term priorities of many international organizations. Among others, the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are becoming absorbed by new internal challenges, and are thus even less interested in further enlargement than before. Against this background, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau, as well as their Western friends, need to seek new paths to increase the three countries’ security, resilience, and growth before their accession to the West’s major organizations. Above all, an alternative way to decrease Ukraine’s current institutional isolation is to develop more intense bilateral relations with friendly states across the globe, including Germany and the United States. In Eastern Europe, moreover, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova should attempt to create new multilateral networks with post-communist member countries of NATO as well as the EU, and try to become part of such structures as the Three Seas Initiative or Bucharest Nine group.


Author(s):  
Anatoliy Goncharenko

Canada and the EU had a common vision of the fundamentals of the international relations system in the late XX – early XXI century and the need to respect the principles of international law. Canada in this matter has always acted together with other international actors on a coalition basis, accumulating defense potential. The EU has seen in Canadians close partners who share its values and have similar approaches to resolving conflict, so there are prospects for development of bilateral cooperation in the international arena. This was possible also due to the emergence of the Common foreign and defense policy of the EU and the implementation of important steps towards the development of European security policy and defense (ESDP). Therefore, at least a hypothetical European defense identity allows Canada to establish international cooperation with the EU in the defense sphere. Ottawa sought to demonstrate that Europe remains important to Canadian and international security interests, so he ESDP must not lead to the destruction of traditionally close relations between Canada and the European partners. Constitutive remains also link Europe with Canada in the framework of NATO. After the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the terrorist attacks of 2001, the EU is particularly interested in boosting relations with Canada. Despite the unity of views and approaches to solving most of the problems of international relations in the late XX – early XXI century between Canada and the EU, a common component in bilateral relations is still far from perfect, leaving the prospects for improving the Canadian-European cooperation on the international arena. Keywords: Canada, the European Union, international relationships, foreign policy


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taras Kuzio

The Ukrainian opposition faced one of the greatest degrees of state-backed violence in the second wave of democratization of post-communist states with only Serbia experiencing similar cases of assassinations and repression of the youth Otpor NGO. In the 2004 Ukrainian elections the opposition maintained a strategy of non-violence over the longest protest period of 17 days but was prepared to use force if it had been attacked. The regime attempted to suppress the Orange Revolution using security forces. Covert and overt Russian external support was extensive and in the case of Ukraine and Georgia the European Union (EU) did not intervene with a membership offer that had the effect of emboldening the opposition in Central-Eastern Europe. This article surveys five state-backed violent strategies used in Ukraine’s 2004 elections: inciting regional and inter-ethnic conflict, assassinations, violence against the opposition, counter-revolution and use of the security forces. The article does not cover external Russian-backed violence in the 2004 elections unique to Ukraine that the author has covered elsewhere.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnija Tumkevič

Today, ensuring security in cyberspace is a top priority of national security policy for most states. States’ approaches to cybersecurity can be divided into two categories: those that regard cybersecurity as a civilian task; and those that involve their militaries in creating or implementing cybersecurity policies. Those states that have incorporated cyberwarfare into their military planning and organization perceive cyberattacks as a threat to their national security, while states that charge their civilian agencies with domestic cybersecurity missions classify cyber intrusions as security risks for only particular sectors. Adopting the framework of securitization theory, this article theorizes both civil and military approaches to cybersecurity and threat perceptions and their sources. The theoretical framework is then applied to a study of the cybersecurity policies of Central European countries and the Baltic States.


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