Privatization and elite defection in de facto states: The case of Transnistria, 1991–2012

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita M. Balmaceda
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
State Affect ◽  
De Facto States

What factors determine the timing of elite defection in conditions of post-Soviet personalistic presidentialism? How do relations with a powerful patron state affect this process? This article analyzes these questions on the basis of a case study of Transnistria, a de facto state with strong links to Russia. It argues that privatization processes involving actors from the patron state provide a unique opening for elite defection by heightening tensions between the rent-seeking interests of the personalistic president and those of new owners; direct or indirect signals from the patron state may also affect elite’s perceptions of incumbent durability and their corresponding decisions.

On the Origins of Administrative Rent: Doing Business in a Russian Region N

2010 ◽  
pp. 58-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleinik
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Resource Rent ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Russian Region ◽  
Positive Gain ◽  
Access To The Field ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.

scholarly journals Political Economy of Coal Mining Policy: A Case Study in Rent Seeking of Surveyor’s Data Manipulation in East Kalimantan (2009-2014)

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Bambang Arwanto
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Economic Incentive ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Mining Policy ◽  
East Kalimantan ◽  
The Social ◽  
Third Person

Both rent seeking and mining policy are two interesting discourses which have enriched the Indonesian policy studies within last two decades. One of prominent problems in this sector is formulation policy process of mining permit (IUP). The concern of mining sector is because the huge economic incentive behind mining business including coal mining. Since the economic incentive is extremely high, the rent seeking is getting higher and more competitive. The competition on rent seeking contest is developed in different policy formulation stages through the elites of business people and bureaucrats.The consequences are the objectivity on issuing the coal mining policy, including extra regulation about surveyors.  The policy formulation in this very case produces the dynamic and complex rent seeking activity among the main players. This study is aimed to reveal the case of rent seeking using surveyors on coal mining policy. Using qualitative method and non positivist approach, this case of study was one of five studies that tried to understand the social relationship among the policy actors during mining policy formulation.Findings in the study were: (i) the role of surveyors as “third person” as mediator who played prominent roles in delivering the interest and determined the data through surveyor’s report, (ii) bargaining power of the businessman to get access in penetrating the bureaucracy through bribing and lobbying, and (iii) the role of bureaucrat in manipulating regulation to accommodate their interest through extra regulation making.

Squatting as Rent-seeking and Pressure-group Competition: A South African Case-Study

Urban Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cedric D. Nathan ◽  
Zane A. Spindler
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Pressure Group ◽  
Group Competition

Spillovers from public entrepreneurship: a case study

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Fuller ◽  
Dylan DelliSanti
Keyword(s):  
Political Engagement ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
City Government ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Economic Calculation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Public Entrepreneurship ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Existing scholarship indicates that more research is needed to explore beneficial spillovers from public entrepreneurship. The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in that literature by examining a case of public entrepreneurship by a corporation. While political engagement by private firms frequently reduces to rent-seeking, this paper explores an instance in which public entrepreneurship by a private firm lead to beneficial spillovers – specifically, positive externalities resulting from the engagement of Cummins Engine Company with city government in Columbus, Indiana. In the case study, these spillovers consist of improved infrastructure, altered norms, and the reintroduction of economic calculation. Design/methodology/approach This case study uses publications in popular outlets, newspapers, and historical documents to understand the relationship between Cummins Engine Company and its local government. Findings Contrary to the presumption that public engagement by private firms necessarily reduces to rent-seeking, the activities of the Cummins Engine Company lead to beneficial public spillovers by way of improved infrastructure and norms, as well as by restoring a degree of economic calculation to the production of public buildings in Columbus, Indiana. Originality/value The authors illustrate the precise mechanisms that generate the potential spillovers from public entrepreneurship that Klein et al. (2010) explore theoretically.

Bribery and corruption in telecommunications: the case of Kenya

Info ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 38-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan Sutherland
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Conflicts Of Interests ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Country Case Study ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose – This paper aims to examine how telecommunications in Kenya was affected by the absence of good governance and the presence of rent-seeking by ministers. Design/methodology/approach – A single-country case study combining approaches of anti-corruption and telecommunications methodologies using secondary and legal sources. Findings – Corruption has been a significant factor, but has also led to distortions in the market which may have been more significant. Research limitations/implications – Given the sensitivity of corrupt dealing, it is impracticable to interview the principals, some of whose identities are concealed behind front companies. Practical implications – It is necessary to modify telecommunications practice to eliminate the use of front companies and those registered in opaque registries to identify conflicts of interests. Originality/value – This is one of only four countries examined in terms of bribery and corruption in telecommunications.

Power and rent-seeking on boards: a case study of national sport federations in India

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Joshua McLeod ◽  
David Shilbury ◽  
Géraldine Zeimers
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking
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