Between willing and reluctant entrapment: CEE countries in NATO’s non-European missions

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Péter Marton ◽  
Jan Eichler

The article focuses on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ experiences related to Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, three non-European theatres of Western military operations, in predominantly Muslim lands, in the decade between 2001 and 2011. CEE countries readily became involved in two of these foreign missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) because of their deep ties to Western politico-economic structures, without direct security interests compelling them to do so, but not without normative convictions regarding what were seen by them as virtues of the two missions. In Libya, however, they were reluctant to join the Western intervention. In light of this, the article is interested in examining how political elites within the region relate to the generally constrained security policy agency that they have. A key argument advanced is that such agency may be located in how external hegemony is mediated in elite discourses of threat and legitimacy construction. This as well as the three case studies outlined in the article show that the seeming changes in CEE countries’ behaviour in fact boil down to a simple set of rules guiding their behaviour. Having identified this “algorithm” as an implicit pattern of CEE foreign policy behaviour, originating in the intra-alliance security dilemma within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the article formulates its conclusions about the alliance policy of these countries largely within a neorealist framework.

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
D. Kalibekuly ◽  
◽  
Y.S. Chukubayev ◽  

The paper examines the dynamics of regional security in Norway as a part of Northern Europe. Being a political and geographical part of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Northern Europe, in its turn, is experiencing the impact of the confrontation between Russia and NATO. Norway's security policy analyzed from the perspective of a regional leader, as a NATO member country participating in the operations of the North Atlantic Alliance and as NATO's northern wing.


Author(s):  
Fleck Dieter ◽  
Newton Michael A ◽  
Grenfell Katarina

This chapter discusses the use of multinational military units. Some European States, such as Germany, have incorporated large, if not most, parts of their national military forces in permanent multinational units. Many other States including the US are forming ad hoc military units for specific operations. The UN, NATO, and other international organizations are pursuing standby arrangements and high readiness commitments to allow for rapid response. In all these situations command and control issues are to be considered. While there are many different forms of multinational military cooperation, and Sending States will avoid regulating these matters in status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) with the Receiving State, they are nevertheless relevant for the law and practice of Visiting Forces. This chapter draws some conclusions on the concept of multinational military operations for the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, and beyond.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-254
Author(s):  
Daniël M. Grütters

The development of international law vis-à-vis international organizations has been limited and not seen an evolution of mechanisms to settle conflicts involving international organizations. In a world in which the role and importance of international organizations continues to grow, their opaque status under international law is a problem. This article discusses the position of the North Atlantic treaty Organization (‘nato’) as an international organization under international law within the context of military operations. If nato has a distinct legal personality and relevant conduct can be attributed to it, it could face potential claims. In this article I will argue that the procedural bar of functional immunity is limiting claimants from bringing such claims, not only impeding access to justice for individual claimants, but also obstructing the development of the position of international organizations under international law, and that the scope and operation of functional immunity should therefore be limited.


Comma ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2019 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Ineke Deserno ◽  
Nicholas Roche ◽  
Barbara Viallet ◽  
Etienne Wintenberger

In 2019, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated 70 years of consultation, consensus and conflict prevention. The same year also marked 20 years since NATO first opened access to its archives to the public. The establishment of the NATO Archives in 1999 was hailed by then Secretary General Javier Solana as an important signal of the Alliance’s commitment to transparency and openness. NATO declassified and publicly disclosed thousands of documents and opened a dedicated Reading Room at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Behind the scenes, the establishment of the NATO Archives and of the Archives Committee also changed the way in which NATO managed its historical records. Up to this point, there was no NATO-wide policy on archives, no organizational archives and no consistency in any of the traditional archival functions. Starting in 1999, NATO could boast a professional archives programme, implemented by trained archivists and governed by a committee of national experts. The programme can claim a string of successes over the last 20 years, implementing archival strategy in novel and unique ways to respond to NATO’s organizational structure. While the Archives are part of NATO’s political headquarters, NATO itself is composed of multiple formal entities under the overall direction of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, including military commands, civilian agencies, military operations etc. Before 1999, each managed their archival material locally, according to internal procedures. This article outlines the Archives’ strategic policies and its governance, involving national experts of all its 30 member nations; presents its increasingly larger and more robust acquisition programme based on a strong and actively managed retention and disposition strategy; assesses its digital preservation activities; and provides an update on NATO’s declassification and public disclosure programme.


Author(s):  
Muñoz-Mosquera Andrés ◽  
Hartov Mette Prassé

This Chapter describes the background and role of the Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty and its supplementing agreements. It gives a detailed account of its application and continuing importance for military operations of the Alliance.


2007 ◽  
Vol 89 (866) ◽  
pp. 239-245 ◽  

AbstractAmbassador Maurits R. Jochems is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations in the International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His functions include responsibility for the Alliance's work in the field of civil emergency planning. As a Dutch Foreign Service career diplomat, he has been seconded to NATO since August 2005. Before taking up his current position he was Director of International Security Policy in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with operations, NATO and EU security policy issues, UN disarmament and arms control, OSCE matters and arms export policy. He has also served at Dutch embassies in Kingston, Bonn, Beirut, Brussels (NATO) and Rome.


1962 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
J. Traizet

A revision of the North Atlantic Track Agreement would make it possible to form a larger group of subscribing companies. The existing tracks could be simplified and the danger of convergence on certain channels avoided by modifying the double landfall at Fastnet and Bishop and by moving certain junctions. This could be done without unduly lengthening the channels. One might also replace the concept of fixed channels by the more liberal one of protected channels, which one might call ‘Naviroutes’.Ships wishing to follow these would benefit from increased safety by the use of certain simple rules, which may be summarized as follows:A neutral zone, varying in size according to the region, of the blue-line type proposed by Oudet and Poll would separate traffic going in opposite directions. In good visibility ships crossing a ‘Naviroute’ would do so at an angle of more than thirty degrees; in fog ships would cross a ‘Naviroute’ at right angles and at low speed. Each of these rules is dictated by commonsense to every seaman with experience of crossing busy shipping channels.


1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaj Petersen

The recent opening of official archives has permitted many new insights into the complex process which led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. One of these concerns the role of the Scandinavian countries, both as actors in their own right, and as pawns in the policy calculuses of the leading western powers. Recently Geir Lundestad has documented in great detail the role which Scandinavia played in American foreign policy in the 1945–49 period and especially in relation to the Atlantic Pact negotiations. In comparison, the position of Scandinavia in Britain's security policy in the period concerned is very little known.


1985 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard K. Betts

For over three decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has based its deterrent on the principle that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe succeeded. This notion has long troubled most strategic analysts. It remained generally acceptable to political elites, however, when U.S. nuclear superiority appeared massive enough to make the doctrine credible (as in the 1950s); when the conventional military balance in Europe improved markedly (as in the 1960s); or when détente appeared to be making the credibility of deterrence a less pressing concern (as in the 1970s). None of these conditions exists in the 1980s, and anxiety over the danger of nuclear war has prompted renewed attention to the possibility of replacing NATO's Flexible Response doctrine (a mixture of nuclear and conventional deterrence) with a reliable conventional deterrence posture that might justify a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) doctrine.1


2021 ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Yury Zverev

The article is devoted to the possible directions of NATO military operations against the Kaliningrad region as an anti-access and area  denial zone (A2/AD), which interferes with the plans of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Baltic region (based on materials from open publications of winter-spring 2021). Shows the danger and unrealizability of these intentions (including on the basis of the results of the Polish military exercise Zima-20).


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