Memory-based stag hunt game on regular lattices

2019 ◽  
Vol 519 ◽  
pp. 247-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukun Dong ◽  
Hedong Xu ◽  
Suohai Fan
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Regular Lattices

An evolving Stag-Hunt game with elimination and reproduction on regular lattices

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 69-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chengyi Xia ◽  
Li Wang ◽  
Ying Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Regular Lattices

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

scholarly journals Coordination and growth: the Stag Hunt game on evolutionary networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (05) ◽  
pp. P05008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Starnini ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Julia Poncela ◽  
Yamir Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Evolutionary Networks

scholarly journals Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toko Kiyonari
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Monetary Gain

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.

scholarly journals Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianna Belloc ◽  
Ennio Bilancini ◽  
Leonardo Boncinelli ◽  
Simone D’Alessandro
Keyword(s):  
Time Pressure ◽  
Time Constraints ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Pressure Treatment ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Social Conventions ◽  
Time Limits ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Stag Hunt Game

Abstract We present an incentivized laboratory experiment where a random sample of individuals playing a series of stag hunt games are forced to make their choices under time constraints, while the rest of the players have no time limits to decide. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag-hunters as opposed to 52.32% when no time limits are imposed. These results offer the first experimental evidence on the role of intuition and deliberation in strategic situations that entail social coordination. In interpreting our findings, we provide a discussion on ruling social conventions in daily-life interactions.

scholarly journals Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N -person stag hunt dilemmas

2008 ◽  
Vol 276 (1655) ◽  
pp. 315-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge M Pacheco ◽  
Francisco C Santos ◽  
Max O Souza ◽  
Brian Skyrms
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Extreme Case ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Infinite Population ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Person Game

In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than two individuals simultaneously. Most of the relevant literature has focused on an extreme case, the N -person Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we introduce a model in which a threshold less than the total group is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing productivity. This model constitutes a generalization of the two-person stag hunt game to an N -person game. Both finite and infinite population models are studied. In infinite populations this leads to a rich dynamics that admits multiple equilibria. Scenarios of defector dominance, pure coordination or coexistence may arise simultaneously. On the other hand, whenever one takes into account that populations are finite and when their size is of the same order of magnitude as the group size, the evolutionary dynamics is profoundly affected: it may ultimately invert the direction of natural selection, compared with the infinite population limit.

scholarly journals Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Dario Madeo ◽  
Chiara Mocenni
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Balanced Development ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Partial Cooperation ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.

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