Emulator with inverse trend in first-order and second-order polarisation mode dispersion

2011 ◽  
Vol 284 (12) ◽  
pp. 2690-2694
Author(s):  
Vitalis Musara ◽  
Samuel K. Fosuhene ◽  
Winston T. Ireeta ◽  
Lorinda Wu ◽  
Andrew W.R. Leitch
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
Mode Dispersion ◽  
Polarisation Mode Dispersion

Effects of first-order polarisation-mode dispersion on clock recovery

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (21) ◽  
pp. 1190
Author(s):  
Y. Benlachtar ◽  
R.I. Killey ◽  
P. Bayvel
Keyword(s):  
Clock Recovery ◽  
First Order ◽  
Mode Dispersion ◽  
Polarisation Mode Dispersion

scholarly journals Representation of second-order polarisation mode dispersion

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (19) ◽  
pp. 1658 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Eyal ◽  
W.K. Marshall ◽  
M. Tur ◽  
A. Yariv
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Mode Dispersion ◽  
Polarisation Mode Dispersion

Nonlinear Analysis of Visual Evoked Potentials Elicited by Color Stimulation

1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (04/05) ◽  
pp. 315-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Momose ◽  
K. Komiya ◽  
A. Uchiyama
Keyword(s):  
Visual System ◽  
Evoked Potentials ◽  
Visual Evoked Potentials ◽  
Normal Subjects ◽  
Second Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Perceived Color ◽  
Second Order Nonlinearity ◽  
Visual Evoked

Abstract:The relationship between chromatically modulated stimuli and visual evoked potentials (VEPs) was considered. VEPs of normal subjects elicited by chromatically modulated stimuli were measured under several color adaptations, and their binary kernels were estimated. Up to the second-order, binary kernels obtained from VEPs were so characteristic that the VEP-chromatic modulation system showed second-order nonlinearity. First-order binary kernels depended on the color of the stimulus and adaptation, whereas second-order kernels showed almost no difference. This result indicates that the waveforms of first-order binary kernels reflect perceived color (hue). This supports the suggestion that kernels of VEPs include color responses, and could be used as a probe with which to examine the color visual system.

Imaginings

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
First Order ◽  
Natural Processes ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Group Violence ◽  
The World ◽  
The Universe

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms (the kinds of religion we find in the world), there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (hereafter M&M), are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others” (3). According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs (they seem to conceive of such natural explanations as debunking explanations). They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes” (3). Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal (according to contemporary psychology of religion), empirically supported (according to philosophy in the form of the Fine-Tuning Argument), and beneficial (and so justified pragmatically). With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good(s) of religion (cooperation, trust, etc) without its bad(s) (conflict and violence). Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational (and possibly true) and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that (first-order) religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too.Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good (agatheism), is rational (agreeing that their particular claims are not) and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world.While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that (a) belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence (and so eliminating first-order religion won’t reduce violence). Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right (but not half wrong), I will argue that (b) the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular (often exclusivist) and the universal (agatheistic) aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that (c) both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. 

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