Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 132-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvain Béal ◽  
Sylvain Ferrières ◽  
Eric Rémila ◽  
Philippe Solal
2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340016 ◽  
Author(s):  
SYLVAIN BEAL ◽  
AMANDINE GHINTRAN ◽  
ERIC REMILA ◽  
PHILIPPE SOLAL

The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
pp. 6401
Author(s):  
Kateryna Czerniachowska ◽  
Karina Sachpazidu-Wójcicka ◽  
Piotr Sulikowski ◽  
Marcin Hernes ◽  
Artur Rot

This paper discusses the problem of retailers’ profit maximization regarding displaying products on the planogram shelves, which may have different dimensions in each store but allocate the same product sets. We develop a mathematical model and a genetic algorithm for solving the shelf space allocation problem with the criteria of retailers’ profit maximization. The implemented program executes in a reasonable time. The quality of the genetic algorithm has been evaluated using the CPLEX solver. We determine four groups of constraints for the products that should be allocated on a shelf: shelf constraints, shelf type constraints, product constraints, and virtual segment constraints. The validity of the developed genetic algorithm has been checked on 25 retailing test cases. Computational results prove that the proposed approach allows for obtaining efficient results in short running time, and the developed complex shelf space allocation model, which considers multiple attributes of a shelf, segment, and product, as well as product capping and nesting allocation rule, is of high practical relevance. The proposed approach allows retailers to receive higher store profits with regard to the actual merchandising rules.


Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 1588
Author(s):  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Jiaying Li

Under the current administrative system (AS) in China, the water resources governor allocates limited water resources to several users to realize the utility of water resources, leading to a principal–agent problem. The governor (referred to as the principal and she) wishes to maximize water resource allocation efficiency, while each user (referred to as the agent and he) only wishes to maximize his own quota. In addition, the governor cannot know water demand information exactly since it is the water users’ private information. Hence, this paper builds an ex ante improved bankruptcy allocation rule and an ex post verification and reward mechanism to improve water allocation efficiency from the governor’s perspective. In this mechanism, the governor allocates water among users based on an improved bankruptcy rule before the water is used up, verifies users’ information by various approaches, and poses a negative reward to them if their information is found to be false after the water is used up. Then, this mechanism is applied to Huangbai River Basin. Research results show that the improved allocation rule could motivate users to report demand information more honestly, and ex post verification could motivate water users to further report their true information, which, as a result, could improve the water allocation efficiency. Furthermore, this mechanism could be applied to the allocation of other resources.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Michael Benedikt ◽  
Clemens Ley
Keyword(s):  

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 617
Author(s):  
Yu-Hsien Liao

In many interactive environments, operators may have to deal with different work objectives at the same time. In a realistic context, such as differences in the target type to be addressed, or changes in the behavior of other operators, operators may therefore have to cope with by adopting different work levels (strategies) at any given time. On the other hand, the importance or influence brought by operators may vary depending on many subjective and objective factors, such as the size of the constituency represented by a congressman, and the bargaining power of a business personnel which may vary. Therefore, it is reasonable that weights are apportioned to operators and arbitrary usability should be distributed according to these weights under various working levels and multiattribute situations. In pre-existing results for allocation rules, weights might be always apportioned to the “operators” or the “levels” to modify the differences among the operators or its working levels respectively. By applying weights to the operators and its working levels (strategies) simultaneously, we adopt the maximal marginal variations among working level (strategy) vectors to propose an allocation rule under multiattribute situations. Furthermore, we introduce some axiomatic outcomes to display the rationality for this weighted allocation rule. By replacing weights to be maximal marginal variations, a generalized index is also introduced.


2014 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Arin ◽  
I. Katsev
Keyword(s):  

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