A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

2014 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 63-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshihiro Ohashi
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Implementation

Ex post implementation

2008 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 527-566 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Implementation

scholarly journals Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Jehiel ◽  
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn ◽  
Benny Moldovanu ◽  
William R. Zame
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Implementation

scholarly journals The Limits of ex post Implementation

Econometrica ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Jehiel ◽  
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn ◽  
Benny Moldovanu ◽  
William R. Zame
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Implementation

scholarly journals Decision under normative uncertainty

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich ◽  
Brian Jabarian
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Normative Uncertainty ◽  
Alternative Theories

Abstract While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.

scholarly journals Ex-post implementation with social preferences

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Zik
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Implementation

Abstract The current literature on mechanism design in models with social preferences discusses social-preference-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable in any environment with social preferences. The literature also discusses payoff-information-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable for any belief and higher-order beliefs of the agents about the payoff types of the other agents. In the present paper, I address the question of whether deterministic mechanisms that are robust in both of these dimensions exist. I consider environments where each agent holds private information about his personal payoff and about the existence and extent of his social preferences. In such environments, a mechanism is robust in both dimensions only if it is ex-post implementable, i.e., only if incentive compatibility holds for every realization of payoff signals and for every realization of social preferences. I show that ex-post implementation of deterministic mechanisms is impossible in such environments; i.e., deterministic mechanisms that are both social-preference-robust and payoff-information-robust do not exist.

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