scholarly journals Development of Reimbursement of New Examination and Treatment Methods (NUB) in the German DRG-System – Analysis of NUB Applications and NUB Status Since Implementation

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. A441
Author(s):  
A Hoffmann ◽  
S Irps ◽  
T Kersting
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maximilian Haenle ◽  
Christina Skripitz ◽  
Wolfram Mittelmeier ◽  
Ralf Skripitz

Background.An enormous economic impact can be observed for infected total knee arthroplasties (TKA). The aim of the present study was to evaluate whether a cost covering treatment of infected TKA is feasible in the German DRG System.Patients and Methods.Average total treatment costs were evaluated for infected TKA and compared with a matched pair of primary TKA. Data was generated using the health record and the hospitals’ health information system. Results were evaluated and compared regarding the total personnel and material costs with respect to the financial receipts.Results.A total of 28 patients diagnosed with an infected TKA were included. A significant increase in the average length of stay, use of medical supplies and third party medical examinations were found for the infected TKA. An average deficiency of 6,356€ per patient was observed for the infected TKA. An average profit of 927€ per patient was made performing primary TKA.Conclusions.A cost-effective treatment of infected TKA was not feasible with the receipts from the German DRG System. An adaption of the receipts has to be evaluated. Moreover, other measures have to be considered in order to achieve a comprehensive medical yet financial reasonable standard in the treatment of infected TKA and THA.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. A613
Author(s):  
M. Fichtenbauer ◽  
M. Kosaner ◽  
M. Urban

2005 ◽  
Vol 32 (10) ◽  
pp. 573-575
Author(s):  
C.-W. Wallesch
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Nadja Kairies-Schwarz ◽  
Claudia Souček

Recent policy reforms in Germany require the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives in the inpatient care sector. We conduct a controlled online experiment with real hospital physicians from public hospitals and medical students in Germany, in which we investigate the effects of introducing a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to a simplified version of the German Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) system using a sequential design with stylized routine cases. In both parts, participants choose between the patient optimal and profit maximizing treatment option for the same eight stylized routine cases. We find that the introduction of bonus–malus incentives only statistically significantly increases hospital physicians’ proportion of patient optimal choices for cases with high monetary baseline DRG incentives to choose the profit maximizing option. Medical students behave qualitatively similar. However, they are statistically significantly less patient oriented than real hospital physicians, and statistically significantly increase their patient optimal decisions with the introduction of bonus–malus incentives in all stylized routine cases. Overall, our results indicate that whether the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to the (German) DRG system has a positive effect on the quality of care or not particularly depends on the monetary incentives implemented in the DRG system as well as the type of participants and their initial level of patient orientation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Schreyögg ◽  
Oliver Tiemann ◽  
Reinhard Busse

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. S277-S278
Author(s):  
L.E. Stollhof ◽  
J.M. Braun ◽  
A. Nüssler ◽  
J. Kufeldt ◽  
C. Ihle ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

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