Government deficits, wealth effects and the price level in an optimizing euro-model

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Annicchiarico
2006 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-535
Author(s):  
Barbara Annicchiarico ◽  
Giancarlo Marini

1961 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard C. Porter

The central banks of underdeveloped economies are frequently ad¬monished for their apparently permissive attitude toward inflation. Where large government deficits are financed by the creation of ever-larger money balances in the economy, this criticism is quite apt. But the strictures often extend to those central banks which, in a situation where prices have already risen for reasons beyond their control,1 are reluctant to refuse the accom¬modating expansion of the money supply. With the argument that the central bank can force prices back to their previous levels merely by insisting that the money supply does not increase, central bankers and their supporters have seldom disagreed. They justify permissive after-the-fact monetary expansions on the grounds that driving the price level back down would have unfortunate side effects.2


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-205
Author(s):  
Barbara Annicchiarico ◽  
Giancarlo Marini

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 124-127
Author(s):  
Dr. G. SELVALAKSHMI Dr. G. SELVALAKSHMI ◽  
◽  
Dr.A.ARUMUGAM Dr.A.ARUMUGAM
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Thomas J. Sargent

This chapter examines the large net-of-interest deficits in the U.S. federal budget that have marked the administration of Ronald Reagan. It explains the fiscal and monetary actions observed during the Reagan administration as reflecting the optimal decisions of government policymakers. The discussion is based on an equation whose validity is granted by all competing theories of macroeconomics: the intertemporal government budget constraint. The chapter first considers the government budget balance and the optimal tax smoothing model of Robert Barro before analyzing monetary and fiscal policy during the Reagan years: a string of large annual net-of-interest government deficits accompanied by a monetary policy stance that has been tight, especially before February 1985, and even more so before August 1982. Indicators of tight monetary policy are high real interest rates on government debt and pretax yields that exceed the rate of economic growth.


1973 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi

The recent uncertainties about aid flows have underscored the need for achieving an early independence from foreign aid. The Perspective Plan (1,965-85) had envisaged the termination of Pakistan's dependence on foreign aid by 1985. However, in the context of West Pakistan alone the time horizon can now be advanced by several years with considerable confidence in its economy to pull the trick. The difficulties of achieving independence from foreign aid can be seen by reference to the fact that aid flows make it possible for the policy-maker to pursue such ostensibly incompatible objectives as a balance in international payments (i.e., foreign aid finances the balance of payments), higher rates of economic growth (Lei, it pulls up domestic saving and investment levels), a high level of employment (i.e., it keeps the industries working at a fuller capacity than would otherwise be the case), and a reasonably stable price level (i.e., it lets a higher level of imports than would otherwise be possible). Without aid, then a simultaneous attainment of all these objectives at the former higher levels together with the balance in foreign payments may become well-nigh impos¬sible. Choices are, therefore, inevitable not for definite places in the hierarchy of values, but rather for occasional "trade-offs". That is to say, we will have to" choose how much to sacrifice for the attainment of one goal for the sake of somewhat better realization of another.


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