Citizenship and power in an agent-based model of tax compliance with public expenditure

An Agent–Based Model of Tax Compliance with Social Networks

National Tax Journal ◽

10.17310/ntj.2007.3.16 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 60 (3) ◽

pp. 589-610 ◽

Cited By ~ 43

Author(s):

Adam Korobow ◽

Chris Johnson ◽

Robert Axtell

Keyword(s):

Social Networks ◽

Tax Compliance ◽

Agent Based Model ◽

Agent Based

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An agent-based model of network effects on tax compliance and evasion

Journal of Economic Psychology ◽

10.1016/j.joep.2013.01.002 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 40 ◽

pp. 119-133 ◽

Cited By ~ 29

Author(s):

Amanda L. Andrei ◽

Kevin Comer ◽

Matthew Koehler

Keyword(s):

Network Effects ◽

Tax Compliance ◽

Agent Based Model ◽

Agent Based

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Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

Revue Française de Sociologie ◽

10.3917/rfs.554.0765 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 55 (4) ◽

pp. 765 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Francisco J. Miguel Quesada ◽

Eduardo Tapia ◽

Toni Llàcer ◽

José A. Noguera

Keyword(s):

Social Influence ◽

Rational Choice ◽

Tax Compliance ◽

Agent Based Model ◽

Agent Based

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AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE: AN APPLICATION TO THE SPANISH CASE

Advances in Complex Systems ◽

10.1142/s0219525913500070 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 16 (04n05) ◽

pp. 1350007 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

TONI LLACER ◽

FRANCISCO J. MIGUEL ◽

JOSÉ A. NOGUERA ◽

EDUARDO TAPIA

Keyword(s):

Social Influence ◽

Tax Evasion ◽

Behavioral Outcomes ◽

Internal Validity ◽

Tax Compliance ◽

Relative Effect ◽

Agent Based Model ◽

Agent Based ◽

Filter Approach ◽

Evasion Behavior

In this paper, we present a new agent-based model for the simulation of tax compliance and tax evasion behavior (SIMULFIS). The main novelties of the model are the introduction of a "behavioral filter approach" to model tax decisions, the combination of a set of different mechanisms to produce tax compliance (namely rational choice, normative commitments and social influence), and the use of the concept of "fraud opportunity use rate" (FOUR) as the main behavioral outcome. After describing the model in detail, we display the main behavioral and economic results of 1,920 simulations calibrated for the Spanish case and designed to test for the internal validity of SIMULFIS. The behavioral outcomes show that scenarios with strict rational agents strongly overestimate tax evasion, while the introduction of social influence and normative commitments allows to generate more plausible compliance levels under certain deterrence conditions. Interestingly, the relative effect of social influence is shown to be ambivalent: it optimizes compliance under low and middle deterrence conditions, but not when deterrence is made harder. Finally, SIMULFIS economic outcomes are broadly in line with theoretical expectations, thus supporting the reliability of the model.

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Taxpayer Compliance Simulation

Social Simulation ◽

10.4018/978-1-59904-522-1.ch002 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 13-25 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Kim M. Bloomquist

Keyword(s):

Economic Theory ◽

Social Networks ◽

Tax Evasion ◽

Tax Compliance ◽

Probability Of Detection ◽

Agent Based Model ◽

Tax Enforcement ◽

Agent Based ◽

Multi Agent

This chapter describes the development of a prototype multi-agent based model – the Tax Compliance Simulator (TCS) – designed to help tax administrators think about ways to reduce tax evasion. TCS allows the user to define unique behavioral, income, and tax enforcement characteristics for one or two distinctive taxpayer populations. The capabilities of the model are demonstrated in a simulation of the deterrent effects of taxpayer audits. The simulation finds that a significant portion of audit-based deterrence may depend on the influence of taxpayers’ social networks rather than the probability of detection or penalty for underreporting as indicated by economic theory (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).

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