scholarly journals Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

2016 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 304-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Ahn ◽  
Santiago Oliveros
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Common Values

scholarly journals Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Basteck
Keyword(s):  
Monotonicity Property ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
The Other ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Property A ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Direct Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Choice Correspondence

AbstractWe characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies unanimity (U) (i.e., elects a candidate whenever it is unanimously preferred) and is majoritarian after eliminating a worst candidate (MEW)(i.e., if there is a unanimously disliked candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected). In a larger class of rules, Approval Voting is characterized by a single axiom that implies both U and MEW but is weaker than Condorcet-consistency (CON)—it is the only direct mechanism scoring rule that is majoritarian after eliminating a Pareto-dominated candidate (MEPD)(i.e., if there is a Pareto-dominated candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected); among all finite scoring rules that satisfy MEPD, Approval Voting is the most decisive. However, it fails a desirable monotonicity property: a candidate that is elected for some preference profile, may lose the election once she gains further in popularity. In contrast, the Borda Rule is the unique direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies U, MEW and monotonicity (MON). There exists no direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies both MEPD and MON and no finite scoring rule satisfying CON.

scholarly journals Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 856-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B. Myerson
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Small Groups ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Sincere Voting ◽  
Multicandidate Elections

A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.

scholarly journals On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules

2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 399-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Peters ◽  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Ton Storcken
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Approval Voting

Rеflection Technology for Developing Pedagogical Competences in Intercultural Education Environments

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rumyana Neminska
Keyword(s):  
Learning Environment ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Intercultural Education ◽  
Traditional Values ◽  
Intercultural Learning ◽  
Common Values ◽  
Exchange Program ◽  
Pedagogical Skills ◽  
Pedagogical Environment

The Faculty of Pedagogy at Trakia University prepares students from different ethnic groups and students who are a part of the Erasmus+ exchange program. This intercultural environment reveals the opportunities for establishing common values ​​in an intercultural learning environment through a broad intercommunication symbiosis. In an intercultural pedagogical interaction, students are given the opportunity to express their identity through the visualization of ideas, attitudes and thoughts. Art texts are used to introduce students to the traditional values ​​of the unknown ethnicity and nationality as well as solving moral dilemmas, breaking stereotypes about behavior and overcoming prejudices. By using a five-module multimedia construct, the pedagogical environment allows students, in addition to personally reflecting on a particular problem, to develop pedagogical skills to guide the process.

Learning Importance of Preferences

10.29007/v68w ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Zhu ◽  
Mirek Truszczynski
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Polynomial Time Algorithm ◽  
Time Algorithm ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Np Hard ◽  
Individual Preferences

We study the problem of learning the importance of preferences in preference profiles in two important cases: when individual preferences are aggregated by the ranked Pareto rule, and when they are aggregated by positional scoring rules. For the ranked Pareto rule, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a ranking of preferences such that the ranked profile correctly decides all the examples, whenever such a ranking exists. We also show that the problem to learn a ranking maximizing the number of correctly decided examples (also under the ranked Pareto rule) is NP-hard. We obtain similar results for the case of weighted profiles when positional scoring rules are used for aggregation.

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