scholarly journals A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types

2016 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 318-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akira Okada
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keniston ◽  
Bradley Larsen ◽  
Shengwu Li ◽  
J.J. Prescott ◽  
Bernardo Silveira ◽  
...  

2005 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume R. Fréchette ◽  
John H. Kagel ◽  
Massimo Morelli

Author(s):  
Michael Cutrone ◽  
Nolan McCarty

This article reviews and analyzes many arguments that are made on behalf of bicameralism. The tools used to make these arguments are the spatial model, the multilateral bargaining theory, and a game of incomplete information. The article attempts to distinguish the effects of bicameralism from the effects of other institutional features that often accompany it, such as differing terms of office and super-majoritarian requirements.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keniston ◽  
Bradley Larsen ◽  
Shengwu Li ◽  
J.J. Prescott ◽  
Bernardo Silveira ◽  
...  

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
pp. 329 ◽  
Author(s):  
CARLO CARRARO ◽  
CARMEN MARCHIORI ◽  
ALESSANDRA SGOBBI

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