scholarly journals Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

2011 ◽  
Vol 146 (5) ◽  
pp. 1733-1769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Fudenberg ◽  
Yuichi Yamamoto
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games

scholarly journals Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melis Kartal
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Time Preferences ◽  
Reputation Games

New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her “type.” The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal information and support cooperation without breach or conflict. I compare these to dishonest reputation equilibria from several perspectives. My results are applicable to a broad class of repeated games. (JEL C73, D82, D83, D86, Z13)

Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

On the theory of repeated games with private information

1991 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hitoshi Matsushima
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games

scholarly journals Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 971-984 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan I. Block ◽  
David K. Levine
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Codes Of Conduct

scholarly journals A Repeated Games-Based Secure Multiple-Channels Communications Scheme for Secondary Users with Randomly Attacking Eavesdroppers

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Van-Hiep Vu ◽  
Huynh Thien ◽  
Insoo Koo
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Cognitive Radio Network ◽  
Multiple Channels ◽  
Radio Network ◽  
Secrecy Rate ◽  
Secondary Users ◽  
Multiple Channel ◽  
Simulation Results

The cognitive radio network (CRN) is vulnerable to various newly-arising attacks targeting the weaknesses of cognitive radio (CR) communication and networking. In this paper, we focus on improving the secrecy performance of CR communications in a decentralized, multiple-channel manner while various eavesdroppers (EVs) try to listen to their private information. By choosing the best channel, the secondary user (SU) aims at mitigating the effects of eavesdropping and other SUs that compete for the same channel. Accordingly, the problem of finding the best channel that maximizes the secrecy rate for the SU is formulated as the framework of multiple repeated games where both the SU and the EVs try to maximize their own performance. In this case, the secrecy rate of an SU is defined based on the expected rewards of the SUs and the EVs. In the paper, we propose a repeated games-based scheme that can provide the best channel for the SU to avoid eavesdropping attacks and also minimize interference from other SUs that compete for the same channel. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can combat a physical layer attack from EVs quite well and can provide much better performance, in comparison with other conventional channel selection schemes.

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