Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

2007 ◽  
Vol 134 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeneng Sun ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 293-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achille Basile ◽  
Chiara Donnini ◽  
Maria Gabriella Graziano
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuj Bhowmik ◽  
Maria Gabriella Graziano
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Asset Markets ◽  
The Core ◽  
Information Models ◽  
The Status ◽  
Initial Improvement ◽  
Core Allocations ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

AbstractThis paper analyses two properties of the core in a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty: the veto power of arbitrary sized coalitions; and coalitional fairness of core allocations. We study these properties in relation to classical (static) and sequential (dynamic) core notions and apply our results to asset markets and asymmetric information models. We develop a formal setting where consumption sets have no lower bound and impose a series of general restrictions on the first period trades of each agent. All our results are applications of the same lemma about improvements to an allocation that is either non-core or non-coalitionally fair. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that if all the members of a coalition achieve a better allocation in some way (for instance, by blocking the status quo allocation or because they envy the net trade of other coalitions) then an alternative improvement can be obtained through a perturbation of the initial improvement.

Analysis of Oligopoly on Electric Power Market under Asymmetric Information

2013 ◽  
Vol 389 ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Yong Luo ◽  
Fang Li
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Load Forecasting ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Forecasting Error ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Aiming at finding the effect of load changing on electricity market, this paper studied Cournot model with asymmetric information based on load forecasting. Firstly, a perfect competition market structure with asymmetric information was built, and a market equilibrium price was obtained based on Cournot model with no load forecasting. Then, using game theory, the impact of load forecasting on intrinsic market power is evaluated analytically based on Cournot model. Finally, the relationship between market equilibrium price, generators profits and the load forecasting result k was obtained by numerical simulation. Some insights were got from this paper. The accuracy of load forecasting will directly affect profits of investment, market equilibrium prices and market forces. And load forecasting is useful if the forecasting error rate is held under 33%. Therefore, the key is to improve the accuracy of load forecasting.

scholarly journals Stable sets for asymmetric information economies

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Gabriella Graziano ◽  
Claudia Meo ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stable Sets ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

scholarly journals On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Postlewaite ◽  
Richard P. McLean ◽  
James D. Peck
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

An Entropy-Based Information Sharing Rule for Asymmetric Information Economies

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Meo
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
The Core ◽  
Cooperative Solutions ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

AbstractThe possibility to compare information partitions is investigated for economies with asymmetric information. First, we focus on two potentially suitable instruments, the Boylan distance and the entropy, and show that the former does not fit the purpose. Then, we use the entropy associated with the information partition of each trader to construct a partially endogenous rule which regulates the information sharing process among traders. Finally, we apply this rule to some examples and analyze its impact on two cooperative solutions: the core and the coalition structure value.

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