A fuzzy goal programme with carbon tax policy for Brownfield Tyre remanufacturing strategic supply chain planning

2018 ◽  
Vol 198 ◽  
pp. 737-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lokesh Kumar Saxena ◽  
Pramod Kumar Jain ◽  
Apurbba Kumar Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Supply Chain Planning ◽  
Fuzzy Goal

Tactical supply chain planning for tyre remanufacturing considering carbon tax policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 97 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 1505-1528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lokesh Kumar Saxena ◽  
Pramod Kumar Jain ◽  
Apurbba Kumar Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Supply Chain Planning

scholarly journals Tactical supply chain planning under a carbon tax policy scheme: A case study

2015 ◽  
Vol 164 ◽  
pp. 206-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behnam Fahimnia ◽  
Joseph Sarkis ◽  
Alok Choudhary ◽  
Ali Eshragh
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Supply Chain Planning

scholarly journals Did the Introduction of Carbon Tax in Australia Affect Housing Affordability?

2013 ◽  
Vol 869-870 ◽  
pp. 840-843
Author(s):  
Xin Janet Ge
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Housing Affordability ◽  
Greenhouse Emissions ◽  
Pricing Scheme ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

The Australian carbon pricing scheme (carbon tax) was introduced and became effective on 01 July 2012. The introduction of the carbon tax immediately increases the cost of electricity to a number of industries such as manufacturing and construction. Households were also affected as a result of these costs been passed through the supply chain of the affected industries. The carbon tax policy was introduced to addresses greenhouse emissions and energy consumption in Australia. However, the carbon tax policy may have introduced a number of economic risk factors to the Australian housing market, in particular the impact of housing affordability.

scholarly journals Impact of Asymmetric Carbon Information on Supply Chain Decisions under Low-Carbon Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Yang ◽  
Jingna Ji ◽  
Chenshi Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
High Carbon ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Asymmetric Carbon

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.

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