Coupled map lattice based hash function with collision resistance in single-iteration computation

2012 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 266-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shihong Wang ◽  
Gang Hu
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
Coupled Map Lattice ◽  
Collision Resistance

scholarly journals Collision Resistance of the JH Hash Function

2012 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 1992-1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jooyoung Lee ◽  
Deukjo Hong
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
Collision Resistance

scholarly journals Haraka v2 – Efficient Short-Input Hashing for Post-Quantum Applications

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Kölbl ◽  
Martin M. Lauridsen ◽  
Florian Mendel ◽  
Christian Rechberger
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
High Performance ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Low Latency ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Collision Resistance ◽  
Preimage Resistance ◽  
Function Design ◽  
General Tool

Recently, many efficient cryptographic hash function design strategies have been explored, not least because of the SHA-3 competition. These designs are, almost exclusively, geared towards high performance on long inputs. However, various applications exist where the performance on short (fixed length) inputs matters more. Such hash functions are the bottleneck in hash-based signature schemes like SPHINCS or XMSS, which is currently under standardization. Secure functions specifically designed for such applications are scarce. We attend to this gap by proposing two short-input hash functions (or rather simply compression functions). By utilizing AES instructions on modern CPUs, our proposals are the fastest on such platforms, reaching throughputs below one cycle per hashed byte even for short inputs, while still having a very low latency of less than 60 cycles. Under the hood, this results comes with several innovations. First, we study whether the number of rounds for our hash functions can be reduced, if only second-preimage resistance (and not collision resistance) is required. The conclusion is: only a little. Second, since their inception, AES-like designs allow for supportive security arguments by means of counting and bounding the number of active S-boxes. However, this ignores powerful attack vectors using truncated differentials, including the powerful rebound attacks. We develop a general tool-based method to include arguments against attack vectors using truncated differentials.

scholarly journals On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Rjaško
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Formal Definition ◽  
Collision Resistance ◽  
Preimage Resistance ◽  
The Family ◽  
Lecture Notes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Cryptographic Techniques ◽  
Security Notion

Abstract In this paper we analyze the Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) preimage resistance security notion for hash functions firstly introduced in [Kelsey, J.-Kohno, T.: Herding hash functions and the Nostradamus attack, in: Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT ’06, 25th Annual Internat. Conf. on the Theory and Appl. of Cryptographic Techniques (S. Vaudenay, ed.), St. Peters- burg, Russia, 2006, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 4004, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2006, pp. 183-200]. We give a formal definition of this property in hash function family settings and work out all the implications and separations be- tween the CTFP preimage resistance and other standard notions of hash function security (preimage resistance, collision resistance, etc.). This paper follows the work of [Rogaway, P.-Shrimpton, T.: Cryptographic hash-function basics: Def- initions, implications, and separations for preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance, in: Fast Software Encryption, 11th Interna- tional Workshop-FSE ’04 (B. Roy et al., eds.), Delhi, India, 2004, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 3017, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp. 371-388], where they define seven basic notions of hash function security and examine all the relationships among these notions. We also define a new property for security of hash function families-always CTFP preimage resistance, which guarantees CTFP security for all the hash functions in the family.

scholarly journals One-Way Hash Function Based on Delay-Induced Hyperchaos

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hai-Peng Ren ◽  
Chao-Feng Zhao ◽  
Celso Grebogi
Keyword(s):  
Stream Function ◽  
Hash Function ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Initial Value ◽  
Arbitrary Length ◽  
Collision Resistance ◽  
Compression Function ◽  
Satisfactory Performance ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Block Chaining

A scheme for constructing one-way Hash function based on hyperchaos induced by time delay and key-stream function iteration is proposed in this paper. In this scheme, the plaintext and secret key are used as the initial value in two hyperchaotic Chen systems; these values are evolved in a hyperchaotic way during a predefined period. The results of the evolution are quantified and iterated using key-stream function iteration to confuse and diffuse the plaintext and secret key. The cipher block chaining mode is used to generate a 128 bits Hash value for a plaintext of arbitrary length. Theoretical analysis and simulation results indicate that the proposed algorithm has satisfactory performance, such as value compression function, irreversibility, initial value sensitivity, forgery resistance and collision resistance.

scholarly journals On the Cryptanalysis of Two Cryptographic Algorithms That Utilize Chaotic Neural Networks

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ke Qin ◽  
B. John Oommen
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Hash Function ◽  
Chaotic Map ◽  
Coupled Map Lattice ◽  
Encryption Algorithm ◽  
Chaotic Neural Networks ◽  
Relative Ease ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
The One

This paper deals with the security and efficiency issues of two cipher algorithms which utilize the principles of Chaotic Neural Networks (CNNs). The two algorithms that we consider are (1) the CNN-Hash, which is a one-way hash function based on the Piece-Wise Linear Chaotic Map (PWLCM) and the One-Way Coupled Map Lattice (OCML), and (2) the Delayed CNN-Based Encryption (DCBE), which is an encryption algorithm based on the delayed CNN. Although both of these cipher algorithms have their own salient characteristics, our analysis shows that, unfortunately, the CNN-Hash is not secure because it is neither Second-Preimage resistant nor collision resistant. Indeed, one can find a collision with relative ease, demonstrating that its potential as a hash function is flawed. Similarly, we show that the DCBE is also not secure since it is not capable of resisting known plaintext, chosen plaintext, and chosen ciphertext attacks. Furthermore, unfortunately, both schemes are not efficient either, because of the large number of iteration steps involved in their respective implementations.

scholarly journals HeW: AHash Function based on Lightweight Block Cipher FeW

2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (6) ◽  
pp. 636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manoj Kumar ◽  
Dhananjoy Dey ◽  
Saibal K Pal ◽  
Anupama Panigrahi
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Statistical Test ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Light Weight ◽  
Avalanche Effect ◽  
Collision Resistance ◽  
Compression Function ◽  
Lightweight Block Cipher ◽  
Slide Attack

<p class="p1">A new hash function <em>HeW: </em>A hash function based on light weight block cipher <em>FeW </em>is proposed in this paper. The compression function of <em>HeW </em>is based on block cipher <em>FeW</em>. It is believed that key expansion algorithm of block cipher slows down the performance of the overlying hash function. Thereby, block ciphers become a less favourable choice to design a compression function. As a countermeasure, we cut down the key size of <em>FeW </em>from 80-bit to 64-bit and provide a secure and efficient key expansion algorithm for the modified key size. <em>FeW </em>based compression function plays a vital role to enhance the efficiency of <em>HeW</em>. We test the hash output for randomness using the NIST statistical test suite and test the avalanche effect, bit variance and near collision resistance. We also give the security estimates of <em>HeW </em>against differential cryptanalysis, length extension attack, slide attack and rotational distinguisher.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>

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