Non-polynomial framework for stress and strain response of the FG-GPLRC disk using three-dimensional refined higher-order theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 228 ◽  
pp. 111496
Author(s):  
M.S.H. Al-Furjan ◽  
Mostafa Habibi ◽  
Aria Ghabussi ◽  
Hamed Safarpour ◽  
Mehran Safarpour ◽  
...  
2005 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 173-182
Author(s):  
A.C.M. Chong ◽  
Fan Yang ◽  
David C.C. Lam ◽  
Pin Tong

Structures are assemblies of planar and three-dimensional objects. Planar components and parts are commonly because the deformation behaviors of plates and beams can be analyzed within the plane problem framework. For micron-scale structures, patterning processes in microfabrications are intrinsically planar and the resulting fabricated structures are also planar. These planar micron-scale structures have been designed and analyzed using conventional mechanics, but increasingly as the sizes of these structures become smaller, higher order effects become significant. In nanometer-scale, surfaces were recognized to play significant roles in affecting the physical behavior. Size dependent elastic and plastic deformation behaviors in micron-scale structures were also observed. Size dependence is an intrinsic part of higher order theory of mechanics and has been used successfully to explain scale dependent behavior in threedimensional structures. In this paper, two-dimensional higher order elastic relations in plane stress and plane strain for compressible solids are developed. The difference between the higher order and conventional elasticity theories is compared


1999 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
X. J. Wu ◽  
S. M. Cheng

In this paper, a higher-order theory is derived for laminates consisting of isotropic layers, on the basis of three-dimensional elasticity with displacements as higher-order functions of z in the thickness direction. The theory employs three stress potentials, Ψ (an Airy function), p (a harmonic function), and its conjugate q, to satisfy all conditions of stress equilibrium and compatibility. Interlaminar shear stresses, i.e., antiplane stresses, are shown to be present at the interfaces, especially near material discontinuities where gradients of in-plane stresses are usually high. For illustrating its practical application, the problem of a plate containing a hole patched with an intact plate is solved.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.


Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney

Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.


Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, because represented by, another, but higher order, cognitive state. The theory arises from the doubtful supposition of unconscious perception and mistakenly construes intrinsic phenomenal character extrinsically, as one state's serving as the content of another. Yet it remains mysterious how and why a higher order state might be so potent as to determine phenomenal character at all. Better to resist higher order theory’s embrace of dubious unconscious perceptual states and account for states so-called simply in terms of humdrum mnemonic malfeasance. Moreover, since the suspect theory allows higher order misrepresentation, it implies sufferance of impossible phenomenal character. Equally problematic, representationalism pitched at the higher order entails the existence of bogus phenomenal character when upstairs states represent downstairs nonperceptual states.


Author(s):  
David Rosenthal

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.


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