Reference point approach for multiple decision makers

2005 ◽  
Vol 164 (3) ◽  
pp. 785-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risto Lahdelma ◽  
Kaisa Miettinen ◽  
Pekka Salminen
Keyword(s):  
Reference Point ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Multiple Decision Makers ◽  
Reference Point Approach

Linear Quadratic Nash Game of Stochastic Singular Time-Delay Systems with Multiple Decision Makers

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 472-480
Author(s):  
Huainian Zhu ◽  
Guangyu Zhang ◽  
Chengke Zhang ◽  
Ying Zhu ◽  
Haiying Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Time Delay ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Delay Systems ◽  
Linear Matrix ◽  
Time Delay Systems ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Multiple Decision Makers ◽  
Nash Strategies ◽  
Singular Time

AbstractThis paper discusses linear quadratic Nash game of stochastic singular time-delay systems governed by Itô’s differential equation. Sufficient condition for the existence of Nash strategies is given by means of linear matrix inequality for the first time. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed theory, stochastic H2∕H∞control with multiple decision makers is discussed as an immediate application.

Method for Selecting Storage Enterprises Based on IFHA

2015 ◽  
Vol 713-715 ◽  
pp. 1769-1772
Author(s):  
Jie Wu ◽  
Lei Na Zheng ◽  
Tie Jun Pan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Multiple Decision Makers ◽  
Intuitionistic Fuzzy ◽  
Averaging Operator

In order to reflect the decision-making more scientific and democratic, modern decision problems often require the participation of multiple decision makers. In group decision making process,require the use of intuitionistic fuzzy hybrid averaging operator (IFHA) to get the final decision result.

Slow Learning in the Market fopr Lemons

2011 ◽  
pp. 149-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Feltovich
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Point Model ◽  
Optimal Amount ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Human Participants ◽  
Slow Learning

Human-participants experiments using markets with asymmetric information typically exhibit a “winner’s curse,” wherein bidders systematically bid more than their optimal amount. The winner’s curse is very persistent; even when participants are able to make decisions repeatedly in the same situation, they repeatedly overbid. Why do people keep making the same mistakes over and over again? In this chapter, we consider a class of one-player decision problems, which generalize Akerlof’s (1970) market-for-lemons model. We show that if decision makers learn via reinforcement, specifically by the reference point model of Erev and Roth (1996), their behavior typically changes very slowly, and persistent mistakes are likely. We also develop testable predictions regarding when individuals ought to be able to learn more quickly.

A Qualitative Analysis of Oncology Patient Awareness of Medication Shortages and Their Preferences for How Shortages Should Be Managed

2020 ◽  
pp. JOP.19.00608
Author(s):  
Andrew Hantel ◽  
Fay J. Hlubocky ◽  
Mark Siegler ◽  
Christopher K. Daugherty
Keyword(s):  
Cancer Care ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Care Center ◽  
Tertiary Care ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
Structured Interview ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Oncology Patient ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Multiple Decision Makers

PURPOSE: Medication shortages in US hospitals are ongoing, widespread, and frequently involve antineoplastic and supportive medications used in cancer care. The ways shortages are managed and the ways provider-patient communication takes place are heterogeneous, but the related preferences of oncology patients are undefined. This study sought to qualitatively evaluate patient preferences. METHODS: A cross-sectional, semi-structured interview study was conducted from January to June 2019. Participants were adult oncology inpatients who received primary cancer care at the University of Chicago, had undergone treatment within 2 years, and had 1 or more previous hospitalizations during that period. Participants (n = 54) were selected consecutively from alternating hematology and oncology services. The primary outcome was thematic saturation across the domains of awareness of medication shortages, principle preferences regarding decision makers, preferences regarding allocation of therapy drugs, and allocation-related communication. RESULTS: Thematic saturation was reached after 39 participants completed the study procedures (mean age, 59.6 years [standard deviation, 14.5 years]; men made up 61.5% of the study population [mean age, 24 years]; response rate, 72.0%). In all, 18% of participants were aware of institutional medication shortages. Patients preferred having multiple decision makers for allocating medications in the event of a shortage. A majority of patients named oncologists (100%), ethicists (92%), non-oncology physicians (77%), and pharmacists (64%) as their preferred decision makers. Participants favored allocation of drugs based on their efficacy (normalized weighted average, 1.3), and they also favored prioritizing people who were already receiving treatment (1.8), younger patients (2.0), sicker patients (3.1), and those presenting first for treatment (5.3). Most participants preferred preferred disclosure of supportive care medication shortages (74%) and antineoplastic medication shortages (79%) for equivalent substitutions. CONCLUSION: In a tertiary-care center with medication shortages, few oncologic inpatients were aware of shortages. Participants preferred having multiple decision makers involved in principle-driven allocation of scarce medications. Disclosure was preferred when their usual medications needed to be substituted with equivalent alternatives. These preliminary data suggest that preferences do not align with current management practices for medication shortages.

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