scholarly journals A general equilibrium open economy model for emerging markets: Monetary policy with a dualistic labor market

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 1392-1404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashima Goyal
2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Pierdzioch

Abstract I use a dynamic general equilibrium two-country optimizing model to analyze the implications of international capital mobility for the short-run effects of monetary policy in an open economy. The model implies that the substitutability of goods produced in different countries plays a central role for the impact of changes in the degree of international capital mobility on the effects of monetary policy. Paralleling the results of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model, a higher degree of international capital mobility magnifies the short-run output effects of monetary policy only if the Marshall-Lerner condition, which is linked to the cross-country substitutability of goods, holds.


Author(s):  
Agnieszka Domańska

The aim of this study is to present selected aspects of fiscal and monetary policy shocks as the subject of studies of open economy macroeconomics. The study concentrates on the development of the model presentation (evolution of the research method) in description of fiscal and monetary policy shocks, with a focus on the modern quantitative approach. At present the modern approach to the research on fiscal and monetary policy shocks is based on advanced methods of data analyzing, such as autoregressive models (VAR), or stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models (DSGE)


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 519-541 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN ELLISON ◽  
LUCIO SARNO ◽  
JOUKO VILMUNEN

We examine optimal policy in an open-economy model with uncertainty and learning, where monetary policy actions affect the economy through the real exchange rate channel. Our results show that the degree of caution or activism in optimal policy depends on whether central banks are in coordinated or uncoordinated equilibrium. If central banks coordinate their policy actions then activism is optimal. In contrast, if there is no coordination, caution prevails. In the latter case caution is optimal because it helps central banks to avoid exposing themselves to manipulative actions by other central banks.


2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Justiniano ◽  
Bruce Preston

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Lindé ◽  
Marianne Nessén ◽  
Ulf Söderström

2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 1213-1241
Author(s):  
Francis Leni Anguyo ◽  
Rangan Gupta ◽  
Kevin Kotzé

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document