Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 432-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Sánchez
Author(s):  
Peter Dietsch

Monetary policy, and the response it elicits from financial markets, raises normative questions. This chapter, building on an introductory section on the objectives and instruments of monetary policy, analyzes two such questions. First, it assesses the impact of monetary policy on inequality and argues that the unconventional policies adopted in the wake of the financial crisis exacerbate inequalities in income and wealth. Depending on the theory of justice one holds, this impact is problematic. Should monetary policy be sensitive to inequalities and, if so, how? Second, the chapter argues that the leverage that financial markets have today over the monetary policy agenda undermines democratic legitimacy.


Author(s):  
Mohammed M. Tumala ◽  
Babatunde S. Omotosho

This paper employs text-mining techniques to analyse the communication strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the period 2004-2019. Since the policy communique released after each meeting of the CBN’s monetary policy committee (MPC) represents an important tool of central bank communication, we construct a corpus based on 87 policy communiques with a total of 123, 353 words. Having processed the textual data into a form suitable for analysis, we examined the readability, sentiments, and topics of the policy documents. While the CBN’s communication has increased substantially over the years, implying increased monetary policy transparency; the computed Coleman and Liau readability index shows that the word and sentence structures of the policy communiques have become more complex, thus reducing its readability. In terms of monetary policy sentiments, we find an average net score of -10.5 per cent, reflecting the level of policy uncertainties faced by the MPC over the sample period. In addition, our results indicate that the topics driving the linguistic contents of the communiques were influenced by the Bank’s policy objectives as well as the nature of shocks hitting the economy per period.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Petrus Simons

<p>The maintenance of price stability is the Bundesbank's ultimate objective. The memory of two hyperinflations within a 30-year period has made the fight against inflation of paramount social and political importance. In the Bank's view inflation engenders uncertainties which may jeopardise capital investment on which the competitiveness of German industry as well as full employment and economic growth depends. The Bundesbank pursues this goal by setting the marginal cost of central bank money required by the banks to finance their expansion. Thus, both the liquidity of the banking system and the cost of borrowing are controlled. This does not necessarily mean that the banks' loan rate of interest is the Bundesbank's Intermediate target. In fact, the Bank does not have one single intermediate target. Since the Bank's views of the monetary sector are manifested in the form of an interlocking system of financial variables, the selection of an appropriate intermediate target depends on the actual economic situation. In this context, the money stock supply (M3) is seen by the Bundesbank as functionally related to bank lending and the accumulation of long-term funds at the banks (monetary capital formation). An increase in interest rates would reduce bank lending, stimulate monetary capital formation and hence reduce the money stock supply (M3). In addition, it would check the utilisation of the money stock supply. This is seen as important because once money has entered the system it may generate unacceptable expenditure flows. To control the growth of the money stock supply, the Bundesbank relies on monetary capital formation, because small stocks of public debt rule out large-scale open market operations. In the Bank's view monetary policy should aim at keeping the banks' loan rate of interest as closely as possible to the natural rate. Lags in this Wicksellian transmission process may arise if the banks have ample margins between their loan and deposit rates when a restrictive monetary policy is implemented. As deposit rates adjust sooner than loan rates to a change in market rates, this also blunts the immediate impact of a policy change. The Bundesbank favours flexible rates of exchange in order to safeguard the financial system against inflows of foreign capital. It would welcome an appreciation of the D-Mark as a contribution to price stability, even though it could result in a loss of employment and exports as it stimulates German business to invest abroad. Furthermore, the Bank aims at constraining the monetary disturbances arising from public sector deficits and collective wage bargaining by means of its annual monetary growth target. This should serve as a signal to non-banks, which they are supposed to internalise in their decision-making. During the review period, the effectiveness of these safeguards was small as witnessed by inflows of foreign capital, large public sector deficits and excessive wage settlements. Moreover, the Bundesbank has been confronted with the development of parallel markets, in particular the Eurocurrency markets, in which borrowers can avoid the effects of its constraints.</p>


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Rochon ◽  
Salewa Olawoye

Author(s):  
Mitsuhiro Furusawa

The chapter highlights the state of monetary policy in Africa and explores the challenges that central banks face as they address the increasingly complex forces at work in the global economy. It sequences the evolution of monetary policy from the time of World War II under the Bretton Woods system to the more recent forward-looking monetary policy in advanced economies and relates it to influencing the evolution of monetary policy frameworks in Africa. Some challenges affecting African countries are identified, including the collapse of commodity prices, persistent high interest rates spreads, and limitations of high frequency data that constrain monetary authorities’ abilities to take corrective actions in a timely manner. The chapter concludes by providing seven principles towards increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy for countries seeking to move towards forward-looking monetary policy frameworks.


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