Complementarity between water pricing, water rights and local water governance: A Bayesian analysis of choice behaviour of farmers in the Krishna river basin, India

2011 ◽  
Vol 70 (10) ◽  
pp. 1756-1766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prakashan Chellattan Veettil ◽  
Stijn Speelman ◽  
Aymen Frija ◽  
Jeroen Buysse ◽  
Guido van Huylenbroeck
Water ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizhen Wang ◽  
Yong Zhao ◽  
Yuefei Huang ◽  
Jianhua Wang ◽  
Haihong Li ◽  
...  

Water-rights trade has proved to be an effective method for coping with water shortages through the transfer of water resources between users. The water allocation system is classified into two categories based on information transparency and water rights transaction goals: administered system (AS) and market-based system (MS). A multi-agent and multi-objective optimal allocation model, built on a complex adaptive system, was introduced to direct the distribution of water resources under an AS in the Shiyang River Basin; it was compared with a market-based water rights transaction model using the bulletin-board approach. Ideal economic agent equations played a dominant role in both models. The government and different water users were conceptualized as agents with different behaviors and goals in water allocation. The impact of water-saving cost on optimal water allocation was also considered. The results showed that an agent’s water-saving behavior was incentivized by high transaction prices in the water market. Under the MS, the highest bid in the quotation set had a dominant influence on how trade was conducted. A higher transaction price will, thus, result in a better benefit ratio, and a lower one will result in inactivity in terms of water rights trade. This will significantly impact the economic benefit to the basin.


Water Ethics ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 45-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Sampford

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-449
Author(s):  
Getahun Antigegn Kumie

The fact that a lot of fresh water resources in Ethiopia are shared between several sovereign states creates a difficult situation in terms of water governance and management. Since there is no central agency that can regulate the utilization of water, the autonomous riparian actors pursue their respective interests. Water is shared at local, national and international levels; and difficulty in water supply management arises from lack of coordination between local, national and international authorities. Most of the Ethiopian rivers are trans-boundary, i.e. shared by several sovereign states. The purpose of this paper is to examine water governance and management systems in the Tekeze River basin. The author uses the qualitative research method to critically examine the existing scarce literature sources and governmental policy documents. The findings of the study revealed the absence of any kinds of bilateral agreements among the riparian states of the Tekeze River basin. As the water governance system in the region is highly politicized, there exists a certain clash of interests between the Tekeze River nations. The constant conflict in the region disrupts cooperation needed for facility maintenance in the Tekeze River basin. The problems in the area arise due to the following factors: no demarcated boundaries between the basin states; no effective water governance system, and, as a result, no efficient and cooperative utilization of fresh water resources; lack of institutional and legal arrangements between the major riparian states.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi ◽  
Huang ◽  
Chen ◽  
Xu ◽  
Liu

In the context of multilevel governance, collaboration among governmental and non-governmental entities across different levels of government is increasingly popular in China’s environmental governance. Policy actors are engaged in two types of collaboration with other local governments: horizontal and vertical collaboration. Policy actors participate in horizontal collaboration when they work with entities at the same level, and in vertical collaboration when working with governments at different levels. This study examines multilevel environmental governance in China by studying how the decisions of policy actors to participate in local water governance networks are influenced by vertical pressures from higher level government and horizontal influences from other policy actors at the same level. We approach the research questions in the empirical context of local water governance in Dongguan city of Guangdong Province. With survey data collected from 31 municipal departments, 32 town governments, nine water-related private businesses and five NGOs, we tested the hypotheses with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The results indicate that vertical pressure and horizontal brokerage are both drivers for participation in the local water governance network.


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