scholarly journals What can autism teach us about the role of sensorimotor systems in higher cognition? New clues from studies on language, action semantics, and abstract emotional concept processing

Cortex ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 149-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel L. Moseley ◽  
Friedemann Pulvermüller
2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-52
Author(s):  
Hayden Kee

This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
KRISTEN SECORA ◽  
KAREN EMMOREY

abstractEmbodied theories of cognition propose that humans use sensorimotor systems in processing language. The Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) refers to the finding that motor responses are facilitated after comprehending sentences that imply movement in the same direction. In sign languages there is a potential conflict between sensorimotor systems and linguistic semantics: movement away from the signer is perceived as motion toward the comprehender. We examined whether perceptual processing of sign movement or verb semantics modulate the ACE. Deaf ASL signers performed a semantic judgment task while viewing signed sentences expressing toward or away motion. We found a significant congruency effect relative to the verb’s semantics rather than to the perceived motion. This result indicates that (a) the motor system is involved in the comprehension of a visual–manual language, and (b) motor simulations for sign language are modulated by verb semantics rather than by the perceived visual motion of the hands.


Author(s):  
Rick Anthony Furtak

Now that the study of emotions has emerged as a thriving field of interdisciplinary research, social psychology and neuroscience have been sources of evidence informing theoretical accounts. One issue is whether emotion and cognition are discrete and emotions thus noncognitive responses. Many philosophers have argued that emotions are independent of “higher” cognition, based upon some neuroscientific findings. Yet they have been too hasty in appropriating indefinite evidence to justify sweeping conclusions: a closer look shows that empirical research does not justify their views. Social psychology has done more to show how closely emotions are correlated with particular bodily states, and this evidence must be taken into account. The role of the living body in our affective experience must be acknowledged, since it is through our living, feeling bodies that we emotionally recognize significant aspects of situations. The embodied phenomenology of emotions is thus linked with the revelation of value or significance.


Author(s):  
Ben Mitchinson

This chapter describes the close relationship between the mental faculty of attention and the physical faculty of orienting, and the importance of this relationship to the construction of artificial biomimetic systems. It reviews the importance of physical orienting to natural motor behavior, which places attention management at the core of all behaviors (“orienting is acting”), and the concomitant social role of physical orienting both in expressing and revealing the focus of a mind. The article highlights the efficiency of top-down and bottom-up processing for behavioral control, using map-based saliency processing as a model, and the suitability of map-based algorithms for parallel or bespoke computation. Given this, and the similar nature of the challenges faced by artificial and natural sensorimotor systems, it is argued that attention management may be a, if not the, key component of future artificial motor control systems.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Hommel

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Van Metre

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winnifred R. Louis ◽  
Craig McGarty ◽  
Emma F. Thomas ◽  
Catherine E. Amiot ◽  
Fathali M. Moghaddam

AbstractWhitehouse adapts insights from evolutionary anthropology to interpret extreme self-sacrifice through the concept of identity fusion. The model neglects the role of normative systems in shaping behaviors, especially in relation to violent extremism. In peaceful groups, increasing fusion will actually decrease extremism. Groups collectively appraise threats and opportunities, actively debate action options, and rarely choose violence toward self or others.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


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