Confidence in one’s social beliefs: Implications for belief justification

Asher Koriat; Shiri Adiv

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.08.008

Exploring Khmer culture: Cultural identity and its relation to values and social beliefs

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e627722013-179 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Christoph Bader

Keyword(s):

Cultural Identity ◽

Social Beliefs

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The Effect of Soft Government Directives About COVID-19 on Social Beliefs in Japan

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3577448 ◽

2020 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Susumu Cato ◽

Takashi Iida ◽

Kenji Ishida ◽

Asei Ito ◽

Kenneth Mori McElwain

Keyword(s):

Social Beliefs

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Predicting the Social Commitments of College Students

NASPA Journal ◽

10.2202/0027-6014.1137 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 38 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ellen Lavelle ◽

Leslie W. O'Ryan

Keyword(s):

College Students ◽

Environmental Concern ◽

Social Attitudes ◽

Social Commitment ◽

Social Beliefs ◽

The Social ◽

Scale Scores

Developmental orientations as measured by the Dakota Inventory of Student Orientations (DISO) are strong predictors of the social attitudes and commitments that college students make. The aim of this study was to investigate the nature of social beliefs and commitments during the college years in relation to developmental orientations as measured by DISO (Lavelle & Rickord, 1999). Results supported Creative-Reflective scale scores as predictive of commitment to the more humanitarian issues such as race and womens rights, whereas Achieving-Social scores predicted environmental concern. Interestingly, Reliant scale scores were found to be negatively related to social commitment. Implications include interventions based on the strengths and weaknesses of each orientation and suggestions for further research.

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Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6

10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

Decision Theory ◽

A Priori ◽

Formal Epistemology ◽

Ethics Of Belief ◽

Naturalized Epistemology ◽

New Developments ◽

The Status ◽

Important Field ◽

Belief Justification

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 6 include the nature of perceptual justification, intentionality, modal knowledge, credences, epistemic supererogation, epistemic and rational norms, expressivism, skepticism, and pragmatic encroachment. The various writers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.

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The Epistemology of Groups

10.1093/oso/9780199656608.001.0001 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Jennifer Lackey

Keyword(s):

Group Level ◽

Social Significance ◽

Individual Group ◽

Key Concepts ◽

Normative Requirements ◽

Group Members ◽

The Individual ◽

Belief Justification ◽

In Virtue Of ◽

Trump Administration

Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.

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