A comparison of shareholder identity and governance mechanisms in the monitoring of CEOs of listed companies in China

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiwei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Listed Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms

scholarly journals The Impact of Corporate Governance on Working Capital Management Efficiency: Evidence from the Listed Companies in the Consumer Services Sector in Botswana

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Sathyamoorthi C. R. ◽  
Christian J. Mbekomize ◽  
Mogotsinyana Mapharing ◽  
Popo Selinkie
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Capital Management ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Working Capital Management ◽  
Management Efficiency ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Moderate Relationship

The paper presents the findings of the analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on working capital management efficiency in the listed companies of the Consumer service sector in Botswana. Eight corporate governance elements and seven working capital components were extracted from the annual reports of a sample of six companies for the period 2012 to 2017 for the analysis. Thirty six observations were obtained. Pearson correlations were executed to determine the relationship between corporate governance elements and working capital components. OLS regression analysis was performed to establish the explaining power of the combination of corporate governance elements on each of the working capital components. The correlation analysis shows that number of non-executive directors has a significant negative but moderate relationship with cash conversion cycle and number of board subcommittees has significant positive but moderate relationship with Debt ratio. The regression results suggest that corporate governance mechanisms have a significant impact on working capital management, the highest impact being reflected on inventory conversion period. The implications of these findings are that boards of directors have a significant role to play in working capital management efficiency of the companies they govern. They should therefore continue providing attainable policies on working capital management and remain vigilant on demanding feedback on their implementations.

Board of directors and financial transparency and disclosure. Evidence from Italy

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariateresa Torchia ◽  
Andrea Calabrò
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Transparency ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between board of directors’ composition (independent directors’ ratio, board size, CEO-duality) and financial transparency and disclosure (T&D). Design/methodology/approach The paper analyzes board composition and financial T&D of Italian listed companies using multiple linear regression analysis. Findings The results of this paper show a significant link between board composition and the level of financial T&D. In particular, the authors found a positive and significant relationship between the independent directors’ ratio and the level of financial T&D and a negative relationship between board size and the level of financial T&D. Research limitations/implications While this paper focuses on a sample of 100 Italian listed companies, the authors acknowledge the importance of extending the results to other national context and to other type of firms (e.g. non-listed firms or SMEs). Moreover, while this paper concerns the amount of information disclosed by firms, it does not look at the quality or accuracy of disclosure. Practical implications This paper reveals the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (such as board composition) in enhancing the level of financial T&D. Indeed, the authors provide some indications to firms to improve their internal governance mechanisms (e.g. the importance of high proportion of independent directors and of small- and medium-sized boards of directors). Originality/value This paper provides interesting insights to firms which are under pressure to improve the level of information to stakeholders. Moreover, has the level of information that is not legally required vary among companies and countries, the authors shed light on a context characterized by high level of ownership concentration, where firms can experience different types of conflict of interests.

CEO reputation and top management team compensation

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Management Team ◽  
National Commission ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Top Managers

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to clarify the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) reputation on top management team (TMT) compensation, proposing corporate governance characteristics as a moderator of the relationships between the power of top managers to extract rents and the importance of external signals. The study aims to expand the domain of executive compensation literature by including the role of CEO reputation in the context of non-Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems. Design/methodology/approach – The paper opted for a panel methodology for the period 2004-2009, including 534 observations from Spanish listed companies. Data were obtained from several sources. Compensation and governance information was obtained from the Spanish Stock Exchange National Commission; data regarding CEO reputation were obtained from Spanish Corporate Reputation Monitor, and, finally, financial statement was obtained from the OSIRIS database. Findings – The paper provides empirical insights on the CEO reputation diffusion on TMT compensation, showing different scenarios depending on effectiveness of corporate governance. CEO reputation diffusion on TMT pay is strengthened or weakened by the organizational governance effectiveness. General evidence supports the notion that in countries characterized by an incomplete corporate governance system, boards – and also indirectly the structure of ownership – act as a catalyst for external signs of legitimacy, rather than for the organization's and stakeholders’ interests. Research limitations/implications – Because of the difficulty in pooling information for a long period from three different sources of data, the number of observations is not very large. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to test the proposed propositions further using other context of corporate governance. Practical implications – The paper includes implications for the development of effective governance mechanisms which promote an adequate link between the CEO reputation and the TMT compensation, avoiding rent extractions. Originality/value – The paper contributes to new international evidences regarding relations between top managers’ reputations and compensation. Specifically, it allows reinforcement of the importance of institutional arguments in the understanding of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in large listed companies.

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