Effects of atrazine and chlorpyrifos on DNA methylation in the brain and gonad of the common carp

Author(s):  
Houjuan Xing ◽  
Chao Wang ◽  
Hongda Wu ◽  
Dechun Chen ◽  
Shu Li ◽  
...  
2007 ◽  
Vol 177 (7) ◽  
pp. 743-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Jastroch ◽  
Julie A. Buckingham ◽  
Michael Helwig ◽  
Martin Klingenspor ◽  
Martin D. Brand

2007 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amal Dayoub ◽  
K. Molnár ◽  
H. Salman ◽  
A. Al-Samman ◽  
Cs. Székely

During a survey on Myxobolus infection of pond-cultured common carp in Syria three Myxobolus spp. were found. Myxobolus dispar infected the gill arteries, forming large elongated plasmodia in the gill filaments. The plasmodia of M. basilamellaris were located in the gill arches at the base of the filaments. Elongated filiform plasmodia of M. encephalicus were found in the blood vessels of the brain. Despite the common occurrence of the above parasites, no disease symptoms were observed in the infected fish specimens. This is the first report on myxosporean infection of fish from Syrian waters.


Author(s):  
William P. Wergin ◽  
Eric F. Erbe

The eye-brain complex allows those of us with normal vision to perceive and evaluate our surroundings in three-dimensions (3-D). The principle factor that makes this possible is parallax - the horizontal displacement of objects that results from the independent views that the left and right eyes detect and simultaneously transmit to the brain for superimposition. The common SEM micrograph is a 2-D representation of a 3-D specimen. Depriving the brain of the 3-D view can lead to erroneous conclusions about the relative sizes, positions and convergence of structures within a specimen. In addition, Walter has suggested that the stereo image contains information equivalent to a two-fold increase in magnification over that found in a 2-D image. Because of these factors, stereo pair analysis should be routinely employed when studying specimens.Imaging complementary faces of a fractured specimen is a second method by which the topography of a specimen can be more accurately evaluated.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-202
Author(s):  
Hekmat Tantauy ◽  
Mariam Sharaf ◽  
Ismail Abd Elnnbi ◽  
Hend Tag
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Ann-Sophie Barwich

How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities on the basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down processes.


Author(s):  
Walter Ott

Descartes’s treatment of perception in the Optics, though published before the Meditations, contains a distinct account of sensory experience. The end of the chapter suggests some reasons for this oddity, but that the two accounts are distinct is difficult to deny. Descartes in the present work topples the brain image from its throne. In its place, we have two mechanisms, one purely causal, the other inferential. Where the proper sensibles are concerned, the ordination of nature suffices to explain why a given sensation is triggered on the occasion of a given brain motion. The same is true with regard to the common sensibles. But on top of this purely causal story, Descartes re-introduces his doctrine of natural geometry.


Biomolecules ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 142
Author(s):  
Mariella Cuomo ◽  
Luca Borrelli ◽  
Rosa Della Monica ◽  
Lorena Coretti ◽  
Giulia De Riso ◽  
...  

The bidirectional microbiota–gut–brain axis has raised increasing interest over the past years in the context of health and disease, but there is a lack of information on molecular mechanisms underlying this connection. We hypothesized that change in microbiota composition may affect brain epigenetics leading to long-lasting effects on specific brain gene regulation. To test this hypothesis, we used Zebrafish (Danio Rerio) as a model system. As previously shown, treatment with high doses of probiotics can modulate behavior in Zebrafish, causing significant changes in the expression of some brain-relevant genes, such as BDNF and Tph1A. Using an ultra-deep targeted analysis, we investigated the methylation state of the BDNF and Tph1A promoter region in the brain and gut of probiotic-treated and untreated Zebrafishes. Thanks to the high resolution power of our analysis, we evaluated cell-to-cell methylation differences. At this resolution level, we found slight DNA methylation changes in probiotic-treated samples, likely related to a subgroup of brain and gut cells, and that specific DNA methylation signatures significantly correlated with specific behavioral scores.


Author(s):  
James Deery

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.


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