scholarly journals Mean field linear–quadratic control: Uniform stabilization and social optimality

Automatica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. 109088
Author(s):  
Bing-Chang Wang ◽  
Huanshui Zhang ◽  
Ji-Feng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Mean Field ◽  
Linear Quadratic Control ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Uniform Stabilization ◽  
Social Optimality

scholarly journals Social optima in leader-follower mean field linear quadratic control

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhui Huang ◽  
Bing-Chang Wang ◽  
Tinghan Xie
Keyword(s):  
Social Cost ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Linear Quadratic Control ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Quadratic Mean ◽  
Weakly Coupled ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Optimality ◽  
Mean Field Approximations

This paper investigates a linear quadratic mean field leader-follower team problem, where the model involves one leader and a large number of weakly-coupled interactive followers. The leader and the followers cooperate to optimize the social cost. Specifically, for any strategy provided first by the leader, the followers would like to choose a strategy to minimize social cost functional. Using variational analysis and person-by-person optimality, we construct two auxiliary control problems. By solving sequentially the auxiliary control problems with consistent mean field approximations, we can obtain a set of decentralized social optimality strategy with help of a class of forward-backward consistency systems. The relevant asymptotically social optimality is further proved under some proper conditions.

On closed-loop equilibrium strategies for mean-field stochastic linear quadratic problems

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
Tianxiao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Optimal Control Problems ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Linear Quadratic Optimal Control ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies

This article is concerned with linear quadratic optimal control problems of mean-field stochastic differential equations (MF-SDE) with deterministic coefficients. To treat the time inconsistency of the optimal control problems, linear closed-loop equilibrium strategies are introduced and characterized by variational approach. Our developed methodology drops the delicate convergence procedures in Yong [Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 369 (2017) 5467–5523]. When the MF-SDE reduces to SDE, our Riccati system coincides with the analogue in Yong [Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 369 (2017) 5467–5523]. However, these two systems are in general different from each other due to the conditional mean-field terms in the MF-SDE. Eventually, the comparisons with pre-committed optimal strategies, open-loop equilibrium strategies are given in details.

scholarly journals Backward-forward linear-quadratic mean-field Stackelberg games

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kehan Si ◽  
Zhen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Large Population ◽  
Consistency Condition ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Mapping Method ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Population System ◽  
The Cost

AbstractThis paper studies a controlled backward-forward linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) large population system in Stackelberg games. The leader agent is of backward state and follower agents are of forward state. The leader agent is dominating as its state enters those of follower agents. On the other hand, the state-average of all follower agents affects the cost functional of the leader agent. In reality, the leader and the followers may represent two typical types of participants involved in market price formation: the supplier and producers. This differs from standard MFG literature and is mainly due to the Stackelberg structure here. By variational analysis, the consistency condition system can be represented by some fully-coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations (BFSDEs) with high dimensional block structure in an open-loop sense. Next, we discuss the well-posedness of such a BFSDE system by virtue of the contraction mapping method. Consequently, we obtain the decentralized strategies for the leader and follower agents which are proved to satisfy the ε-Nash equilibrium property.

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