Symmetric zero-sum two-person game

2011 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum

scholarly journals Cooperative dynamic non-zero-sum of two-person game

1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-461
Author(s):  
S. Vakrinienė
Keyword(s):  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum

The abstracts (in two languages) can be found in the pdf file of the article. Original author name(s) and title in Russian and Lithuanian: С. Вакринене. Кооперативная динамическая неантагонистическая игра двух лиц S. Vakrinienė. Kooperatinis dinaminis neantagonistinis dviejų asmenų lošimas

scholarly journals A Comparative Study on Two Person Zero Sum Game Problems Through Computer Algebra

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
HK Das
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Computer Algebra ◽  
Computer Technique ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Current Technique ◽  
Current Algorithm ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Better Than

This paper improves a game theoretic algorithm and develops its computer oriented program using MATHEMATICA for solving two person zero sum game problems. The algorithm and computer algebra are drawn upon mainly from two sources, namely the papers H. K. Das, Saha and Hasan5; H. K. Das and Hasan6 being able to solve two person zero sum game problems with single payoff elements. We do a comparative study of the current algorithm and computer technique with the papers5, 6. We show that the current technique is better than the papers5, 6 in saving labor and time for solving two person game problems by analyzing a number of numerical examples. Dhaka Univ. J. Sci. 65(1): 1-7, 2017 (January)

Legal Disputes Resolved via Game Theoretic Methods

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1540015 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. S. Raghavan
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Hourly Wage ◽  
Old Babylonian ◽  
Solution Methods ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Mathematical Foundations ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual legal disputes in practice. We choose an example from union management conflict on hourly wage dispute and how zero sum two person game theory can be used by a judge to bring about the need for realistic compromises between the two parties. We choose another example from the 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud to describe how a certain debt problem was resolved. While they may be unaware of cooperative game theory, their solution methods are fully consistent with the solution concept called the nucleolus of a TU game.

Theoretical Underpinnings of India–Pakistan Relations

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-312
Author(s):  
Ashish Shukla
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Complex Situation ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum

The India–Pakistan relations have historically been marked by mistrust, broken promises, unresolved issues and unending conflicts. A number of divisive factors shaped and influenced the nature of this relationship which inter alia includes large-scale violence at the time of partition, perceptual enmity and numerous unresolved issues including Kashmir. Due to all these reasons, the two countries have found themselves locked in a complex situation that could best be described using zero-sum two-person game. The author argues that perceptions play an important role in shaping the nature of bilateral relations. He goes on to identify six different prisms—three each in India and Pakistan—through which one can understand the nature and direction of this otherwise difficult relationship.

On the Size of Winning Coalitions

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 505-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Solution Theory ◽  
Size Principle ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Special Case

A recent note by Robert Butterworth is critical of William Riker's size principle on several important grounds. There is, however, an important omission in his analysis which this present essay aims to correct. The author goes on to tie assertions about coalition structure in n-person zero-sum games to a solution theory for such games. In the appendix to this essay the general five-person game, of which Butterworth's game is a special case, is considered in some detail. The effect, with one reasonable solution theory, is a favorable appraisal of the size principle.

scholarly journals Certain Infinite Zero-Sum Two-Person Games

1956 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 412-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. L. Dulmage ◽  
J. E. L. Peck
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Games ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Zero Sum

1. Introduction. The theorem of von Neumann, that every finite, zero-sum two-person game has a value, has been extended in various ways to infinite games. In particular Wald (6) has shown that any bounded game in which one player has finitely many pure strategies, has a value. Our interest was aroused by the infinite analogue of the game of “hide and seek” as described by von Neumann (5), which does not appear to fit any of the known cases, unless the matrix is bounded.

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