Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van den Brink ◽  
Gerard van der Laan
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Banzhaf Value ◽  
The Shapley Value

THE SHAPLEY VALUE, THE OWEN VALUE, AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ CASAJUS
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Banzhaf Value ◽  
Owen Value ◽  
Symmetric Distributions ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Cooperation Structure

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property.

scholarly journals Some Recursive Definitions for Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games

Game Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irinel Dragan
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Banzhaf Value ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Tu Games ◽  
Power Game ◽  
Recursive Definitions

We give recursive definitions for the Banzhaf Value and the Semivalues of cooperative TU games. These definitions were suggested by the concept of potential for the Shapley Value due to Hart and Mas-Colell and by some results of the author who introduced the potentials of these values and the Power Game of a given game.

Query Games in Databases

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Computational Aspects ◽  
Aggregate Query ◽  
Boolean Query

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.

scholarly journals A new basis and the Shapley value

2016 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 21-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koji Yokote ◽  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Yoshio Kamijo
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
The Shapley Value

COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN n-PERSON GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 08 (05) ◽  
pp. 503-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
SILVIU GUIASU
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Statistical Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Minimum Deviation ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Person Game

A solution of n-person games is proposed, based on the minimum deviation from statistical equilibrium subject to the constraints imposed by the group rationality and individual rationality. The new solution is compared with the Shapley value and von Neumann-Morgenstern's core of the game in the context of the 15-person game of passing and defeating resolutions in the UN Security Council involving five permanent members and ten nonpermanent members. A coalition classification, based on the minimum ramification cost induced by the characteristic function of the game, is also presented.

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