Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco De Sinopoli
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Equilibrium Refinements

Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
District Level ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Third Place ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Duverger's Law

In districts where only one seat is contested, the electoral formula (plurality or majority) should be a major determinant of the number of parties that receive votes. Specifically, plurality rule should generate two-party competition while other institutional arrangements should generate electoral fragmentation. Yet tests of these propositions using district-level data have focused on a limited number of cases; they rarely contrast different electoral systems and have reached mixed conclusions. This study analyses district-level data from 6,745 single-member district election contests from 53 democratic countries to test the evidence for Duverger's Law and Hypothesis. Double-ballot majoritarian systems have large numbers of candidates, as predicted, but while the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition, it is not perfectly so. The two largest parties typically dominate the districts (generally receiving more than 90 per cent of the vote), and there is very little support for parties finishing fourth or worse. Yet third-place parties do not completely disappear, and ethnic divisions shape party fragmentation levels, even under plurality rule. Finally, institutional rules that generate multiparty systems elsewhere in the country increase electoral fragmentation in single-member plurality districts.

Consensus sequences based on plurality rule

1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (6) ◽  
pp. 1057-1068 ◽  
Author(s):  
W DAY ◽  
F MCMORRIS
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Consensus Sequences

Equilibrium refinements

Game Theory ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 251-299
Author(s):  
Michael Maschler ◽  
Eilon Solan ◽  
Shmuel Zamir
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Refinements

scholarly journals Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-244
Author(s):  
Alexander Mayer ◽  
Stefan Napel
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Executive Director ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
To Come ◽  
A Priori Distribution ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Abstract Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA’s Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.

Convergence of Iterative Voting Under Restrictive Dynamics for Plurality Rule: A Review

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saira Sultan ◽  
Al Syeda Maham Huda ◽  
Afsana Durrani ◽  
Hadia Bibi ◽  
Neelam Gohar
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Iterative Voting
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