Robustness of optimal mixed strategies

1998 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 485-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patsy Haccou ◽  
Yoh Iwasa
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Optimal Mixed Strategies

scholarly journals Game-theoretic model of a volunteer computer GRID

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 76-90
Author(s):  
Илья Чернов ◽  
Ilya Chernov
Keyword(s):  
Monotone Function ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Volunteer Computing ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Wrong Answer ◽  
Desktop Grid ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Mixed Strategies

In the paper we propose a simple game-theoretic model of a Desktop Grid for volunteer computing. Task replication reduces the risk of accepting wrong answers due to sabotage. Saboteur's attack by intruding multiple computing nodes brings him some profit in case a wrong answer is accepted, while the server suffers some penalty in this case. Nodes are assigned some reputation as a monotone function of the number of produced correct (or not exposed) answers. We obtain the optimal mixed strategies and show that the average gain of the players depends only on the server's penalty, nodes' reputation, and the size of the subgrid of nodes with the same reputation. Also we estimate the server's cost per an answer. Numerical examples show that the average cost of the server is not more than that in the case when the number of intruders is known.

scholarly journals Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽  
Ustav Malkov
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Hippocratic Oath ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Berge Equilibrium ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199417
Author(s):  
Vesna Danilovic ◽  
Joe Clare
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Theoretical Rationale ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Tit For Tat

Our study compares the efficacy of mixed bargaining strategies to strict coercion or accommodation. While mixed strategies can be approached from different conceptual angles, we focus on flexible and/or firm postures as signaling properties of bargaining. In our theory and empirical analysis, we show that the combination of firmness with flexibility on both sides, without necessarily scripted rules as in tit-for-tat, leads to peaceful resolution without unilateral concessions. Its opposite, resolute firmness is unlikely to make the opponent yield, as assumed in influential literature of the traditional canon. If anything, war is most likely when both sides opt for it. We provide the theoretical rationale for these expectations, which are validated in our empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the 1918 to 2015 period. Our study also points to the bargaining process as a potential causal mechanism between democracy and peace, and therefore has relevant implications for several research strands.

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