A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Compatible

The randomized communication complexity of revenue maximization

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-83
Author(s):  
Aviad Rubinstein ◽  
Junyao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bounds ◽  
Communication Complexity ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Valuation Function ◽  
Optimal Auctions ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
First Approximation ◽  
Exponential Separation ◽  
Open Question

We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items [Rubinstein and Zhao 2021]. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are randomized [Thanassoulis 2004; Manelli and Vincent 2010; Briest et al. 2010; Pavlov 2011; Hart and Reny 2015] (as well as by an open problem of Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Nisan [Babaioff et al. 2017]), we focus on the randomized communication complexity of this problem (in contrast to most prior work on deterministic communication). We design simple, incentive compatible, and revenue-optimal auction-protocols whose expected communication complexity is much (in fact infinitely) more efficient than their deterministic counterparts. We also give nearly matching lower bounds on the expected communication complexity of approximately-revenue-optimal auctions. These results follow from a simple characterization of incentive compatible auction-protocols that allows us to prove lower bounds against randomized auction-protocols. In particular, our lower bounds give the first approximation-resistant, exponential separation between communication complexity of incentivizing vs implementing a Bayesian incentive compatible social choice rule, settling an open question of Fadel and Segal [Fadel and Segal 2009].

Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (03) ◽  
pp. 1650007
Author(s):  
Anat Lerner ◽  
Rica Gonen
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Constrained Efficiency ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Sufficient And Necessary Conditions ◽  
Multidimensional Types ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Efficient Mechanisms

The seminal work by Green and Laffont [(1977) characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods, Econometrica 45, 427–438] shows that efficient mechanisms with Vickrey–Clarke–Groves prices satisfy the properties of dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational in the quasilinear utilities model. Nevertheless in many real-world situations some players have a gap between their willingness to pay and their ability to pay, i.e., a budget. We show that once budgets are integrated into the model then Green and Laffont’s theorem ceases to apply. More specifically, we show that even if only a single player has budget constraints then there is no deterministic efficient mechanism that satisfies the individual rationality and DSIC properties. Furthermore, in a quasilinear utilities model with [Formula: see text] nonidentical items and [Formula: see text] players with multidimensional types, we characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions under which Green and Laffont’s theorem holds in the presence of budget-constrained players. Interestingly our characterization is similar in spirit to that of Maskin [(2000) Auctions, development and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers, Eur. Econ. Rev. 44, 667–681] for Bayesian single-item constrained-efficiency auctions.

The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (02) ◽  
pp. 2040005
Author(s):  
Mohsen Pourpouneh ◽  
Rasoul Ramezanian ◽  
Arunava Sen
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Priority Rules ◽  
Marriage Problem ◽  
Interdependent Preferences ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Women’S Preferences ◽  
Matching Rules

This paper considers the Gale–Shapley model with interdependent preferences. Women’s preferences over men are common knowledge but whether or not a man is acceptable depends on the preferences of men which are private information. It is shown that no ex-post incentive-compatible and ex-post stable matching rules exist. A characterization of ex-post incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational and ex-post nonbossy matching rules in terms of modified priority rules is provided.

Privacy, Personalization, and Price Discrimination

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinem Hidir ◽  
Nikhil Vellodi
Keyword(s):  
Market Segmentation ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Search Interface ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Consumer Privacy ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Novel Design

Abstract We study a bilateral trade setting in which a buyer has private valuations over a multi-product seller’s inventory. We introduce the notion of an incentive-compatible market segmentation (IC-MS)—a market segmentation compatible with the buyer’s incentives to voluntarily reveal their preferences. Our main result is a characterization of the buyer-optimal IC-MS. It is partially revealing, comprised primarily of pooling segments wide enough to keep prices low but narrow enough to ensure trade over relevant products. We use our results to study a novel design problem in which a retail platform seeks to attract consumers by calibrating the coarseness of its search interface. Our analysis speaks directly to consumer privacy and the debate regarding product steering versus price discrimination in online retail.

Optimizing for Distributional Goals in School Choice Problems

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (8) ◽  
pp. 3657-3676
Author(s):  
Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Neighborhood Schools ◽  
Boston Public Schools ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
The Status ◽  
Student Welfare

I investigate three goals of school choice: welfare, encouraging neighborhood schools, and diversity. I use optimization problems to find the best stable and incentive compatible match for any combination of these objectives. These problems assume there is a continuum of students and school seats, which allows me to describe the incentive compatibility conditions in a tractable form. I prove that the set of stable matchings is generically continuous in the distribution of students and the school capacities, which implies that the characterization of the possible stable matches in the continuum model approximates the set of stable matches in a matching market with a large, but finite, number of students. I then apply my framework to data from Boston Public Schools. If the mechanism conditions on demographics, the improvement (relative to the status quo) in student welfare is equivalent to moving 291 students (out of 3,479) to schools one rank higher in their preference lists. In contrast, if the mechanism does not condition on demographics, the welfare improvement is equivalent to moving only 25.1 students to schools one rank higher. Improvements in the distributional goals can be made (e.g., increasing enrollment in neighborhood schools by 50%) without reducing welfare or diversity. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.

Morphological Characterization of Mycobacteriophage R1

1974 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 254-255
Author(s):  
B. L. Soloff ◽  
T. A. Rado
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Source ◽  
Stationary Phase ◽  
Growth Phase ◽  
Minimal Medium ◽  
Morphological Characterization ◽  
Logarithmic Growth Phase ◽  
Complete Lysis ◽  
Lysogenic Culture ◽  
Logarithmic Growth

Mycobacteriophage R1 was originally isolated from a lysogenic culture of M. butyricum. The virus was propagated on a leucine-requiring derivative of M. smegmatis, 607 leu−, isolated by nitrosoguanidine mutagenesis of typestrain ATCC 607. Growth was accomplished in a minimal medium containing glycerol and glucose as carbon source and enriched by the addition of 80 μg/ ml L-leucine. Bacteria in early logarithmic growth phase were infected with virus at a multiplicity of 5, and incubated with aeration for 8 hours. The partially lysed suspension was diluted 1:10 in growth medium and incubated for a further 8 hours. This permitted stationary phase cells to re-enter logarithmic growth and resulted in complete lysis of the culture.

AEM analysis of crystallization in Ti-based amorphous alloys

1983 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 270-271
Author(s):  
A.R. Pelton ◽  
A.F. Marshall ◽  
Y.S. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Properties ◽  
Amorphous Alloys ◽  
Amorphous Materials ◽  
Isothermal Annealing ◽  
Amorphous Matrix ◽  
Nucleation And Growth ◽  
Current Interest ◽  
Amorphous Films ◽  
Electrical And Magnetic Properties

Amorphous materials are of current interest due to their desirable mechanical, electrical and magnetic properties. Furthermore, crystallizing amorphous alloys provides an avenue for discerning sequential and competitive phases thus allowing access to otherwise inaccessible crystalline structures. Previous studies have shown the benefits of using AEM to determine crystal structures and compositions of partially crystallized alloys. The present paper will discuss the AEM characterization of crystallized Cu-Ti and Ni-Ti amorphous films.Cu60Ti40: The amorphous alloy Cu60Ti40, when continuously heated, forms a simple intermediate, macrocrystalline phase which then transforms to the ordered, equilibrium Cu3Ti2 phase. However, contrary to what one would expect from kinetic considerations, isothermal annealing below the isochronal crystallization temperature results in direct nucleation and growth of Cu3Ti2 from the amorphous matrix.

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