scholarly journals Diversification, convex preferences and non-empty core in the Choquet expected utility model

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Chateauneuf ◽  
Jean-Marc Tallon
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Choquet Expected Utility ◽  
Convex Preferences ◽  
Expected Utility Model ◽  
Empty Core

Sharing beliefs and the absence of betting in the Choquet expected utility model

2002 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Billot ◽  
Alain Chateauneuf ◽  
Itzhak Gilboa ◽  
Jean-Marc Tallou
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Choquet Expected Utility ◽  
Expected Utility Model

THE RE-OPENING OF DUBINS AND SAVAGE CASINO IN THE ERA OF DIVERSIFICATION

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-65
Author(s):  
Isaac Meilijson
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Portfolio Management ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Choquet Expected Utility ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Dynamic Programing ◽  
Expected Utility Model

In Dynamic Programing, mixed strategies consist of randomizing the choice of actions. In some problems, such as portfolio management, it makes sense to diversify actions rather than choosing among them purely or randomly. Optimal betting in casinos and roulette by a gambler with fixed goal was studied by Dubins and Savage [9] and their school without the element of diversification (betting simultaneously on different holes of the roulette), once it was proved (Smith's theorem - Smith [16], Dubins [8] and Gilat and Weiss [10]) that diversification does not increase the probability of reaching the goal. We question the scope of this finding, that was based on the assumption that the holes on which gamblers can bet are disjoint, such as 1 and BLACK in regular roulette. A counter example is provided in which holes are nested, such as 1 and RED. Thus, it may be rational for gamblers with a fixed goal to place chips on more than one hole at the table.This note is related to a joint work with Michèle Cohen on the preference for safety in the Choquet Expected Utility model.

The Expected Utility of Insurance

2019 ◽  
pp. 8-47
Author(s):  
Brad Epperly
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Personal Security ◽  
Power Means ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
The Future ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Expected Utility Model

This chapter offers a new version of popular “insurance” models of judicial independence, in which the competitiveness of the electoral arena induces leaders to prefer more independent courts, as a means of offering policy and personal security if they lose power. That is, paying the “premium” of increased constraints on behavior imposed by independent courts now for the insurance of protection in the future if out of office. The crux of the argument is that the risks associated with losing power in autocratic regimes are greater than in democracies, and therefore competition should be more salient in dictatorships than democracies. The stakes are higher because autocratic power means access to wealth and state resources in a way rarely equaled in democratic regimes, and more importantly the likelihood of being punished after leaving office is greater for former autocrats. Judiciaries exercising greater independence, however, can minimize the risks of being a former leader, and the chapter leverages this finding to develop an expected utility model, the empirical implication of which is higher salience of competition—when present—in autocracies. Unlike previous theories of how competition affects independence, this model integrates both the likelihood of losing office and the risks associated with such an outcome, and thus allows us to examine the phenomena across the democracy/dictatorship divide.

Dynamic safety first expected utility model

2018 ◽  
Vol 271 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mei Choi Chiu ◽  
Hoi Ying Wong ◽  
Jing Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Expected Utility Model ◽  
Safety First
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