scholarly journals A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Rosenmüller ◽  
Benyamin Shitovitz
2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Rosenmüller ◽  
Benyamin Shitovitz

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 159-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
DELFINA FEMENIA ◽  
MABEL MARÍ ◽  
ALEJANDRO NEME ◽  
JORGE OVIEDO

In this paper, we present a matching market in which an institution has to hire a set of pairs of complementary workers, and has a quota that is the maximum number of candidates pair positions to be filled. We define a stable solution and first show that in the unrestricted institution preferences domain, the set of stable solution may be empty and second we obtain a complete characterization of the stable sets under responsive restriction of the institution's preference.


1998 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 743-750
Author(s):  
Ichiro NISHIZAKI ◽  
Masatoshi SAKAWA ◽  
Yasushi FUJINO

2006 ◽  
Vol 157 (10) ◽  
pp. 1362-1383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisenda Molina ◽  
Juan Tejada

1985 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans ◽  
Daniel Granot

1975 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 358-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Owen

Author(s):  
F. R. Fernández ◽  
M. A. Hinojosa ◽  
A. Marmol ◽  
J. Puerto

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