On the manifold of control processes in Lagrange problems

2006 ◽  
pp. 437-441
Author(s):  
András Kósa
Keyword(s):  
Lagrange Problems ◽  
Control Processes

A Bird in the Hand Isn’t Good for Long

2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Scherbaum ◽  
Simon Frisch ◽  
Maja Dshemuchadse
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Control ◽  
The Other ◽  
Decision Task ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Additional Time ◽  
Control Processes ◽  
Folk Wisdom ◽  
Study Participants ◽  
Insight Into

Abstract. Folk wisdom tells us that additional time to make a decision helps us to refrain from the first impulse to take the bird in the hand. However, the question why the time to decide plays an important role is still unanswered. Here we distinguish two explanations, one based on a bias in value accumulation that has to be overcome with time, the other based on cognitive control processes that need time to set in. In an intertemporal decision task, we use mouse tracking to study participants’ responses to options’ values and delays which were presented sequentially. We find that the information about options’ delays does indeed lead to an immediate bias that is controlled afterwards, matching the prediction of control processes needed to counter initial impulses. Hence, by using a dynamic measure, we provide insight into the processes underlying short-term oriented choices in intertemporal decision making.

Metacognitively guided retrieval and report (META-RAR): Quality control processes in recall

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morris Goldsmith ◽  
Larry L. Jacoby ◽  
Vered Halamish ◽  
Christopher N. Wahlheim
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Control Processes

Action and the Problem of Free Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Motor Control ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Control Processes ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Neuronal Processes

This chapter examines the concept of free will as it is discussed in philosophy and neuroscience. It reviews reflective and perceptual theories of agency and argues against neuro-centric conclusions about the illusory nature of free will. Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet suggest that neural activations prior to conscious awareness predict specific actions. This has been taken as evidence that challenges the traditional notion of free will. Libet’s experiments, arguably, are about motor control processes on an elementary timescale and say nothing about freely willed intentional actions embedded in personal and social contexts that involve longer-term, narrative timescales. One implication of this interpretation is that enactivism is not a form of simple behaviorism. Agency is not a thing reducible to elementary neuronal processes; nor is it an idea or a pure consciousness. It rather involves a structure of complex relations.

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