Iterative computation of nash equilibria in M-player games with partial weak coupling

2006 ◽  
pp. 245-256
Author(s):  
Tamer Başar ◽  
R. Srikant
Keyword(s):  
Weak Coupling ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Iterative Computation

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Concrete mechanical behaviour and calcium leaching weak coupling

2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 1147-1175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurie Lacarrièrre ◽  
Alain Sellier ◽  
Xavier Bourbon
Keyword(s):  
Mechanical Behaviour ◽  
Weak Coupling ◽  
Calcium Leaching

Berge and Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (11) ◽  
pp. 2108-2131
Author(s):  
V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
A. S. Gorbatov ◽  
K. N. Kudryavtsev
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Differential ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Linear Quadratic

scholarly journals Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Julian Gutierrez ◽  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Giuseppe Perelli ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Infinite Sequence ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Logics ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Boolean Games

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent  has a goal  , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal  captures agent  ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of  represent system behaviours that would satisfy  . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values for variables in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of  ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment of : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within ? We show that this is not true in general.

scholarly journals Importance of $${{d}}_{{{xy}}}$$ orbital and electron correlation in iron-based superconductors revealed by phase diagram for 1111-system

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Kawashima ◽  
Shigeki Miyasaka ◽  
Hirokazu Tsuji ◽  
Takahiro Yamamoto ◽  
Masahiro Uekubo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Electron Correlation ◽  
Weak Coupling ◽  
Structural Parameters ◽  
Structural Flexibility ◽  
Superconducting Transition ◽  
Iron Based Superconductors ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Band Filling ◽  
Iron Based ◽  
Correlation Strength

AbstractThe structural flexibility at three substitution sites in LaFeAsO enabled investigation of the relation between superconductivity and structural parameters over a wide range of crystal compositions. Substitutions of Nd for La, Sb or P for As, and F or H for O were performed. All these substitutions modify the local structural parameters, while the F/H-substitution also changes band filling. It was found that the superconducting transition temperature $$T_{\text{c}}$$ T c is strongly affected by the pnictogen height $$h_{Pn}$$ h Pn from the Fe-plane that controls the electron correlation strength and the size of the $$d_{xy}$$ d xy hole Fermi surface (FS). With increasing $$h_{Pn}$$ h Pn , weak coupling BCS superconductivity switches to the strong coupling non-BCS one where electron correlations and the $$d_{xy}$$ d xy hole FS may be important.

Nash equilibria in electricity pool markets with large-scale wind power integration

Energy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 228 ◽  
pp. 120642
Author(s):  
Evangelos G. Tsimopoulos ◽  
Michael C. Georgiadis
Keyword(s):  
Wind Power ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Wind Power Integration
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