A problem of non-zero sum stopping game

2006 ◽  
pp. 310-315
Author(s):  
J. P. Lepeltier ◽  
E. Etourneau
Keyword(s):  
Stopping Game ◽  
Zero Sum

On a discrete-time non-zero-sum Dynkin problem with monotonicity

1991 ◽  
Vol 28 (02) ◽  
pp. 466-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Ohtsubo
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Time Parameter ◽  
Stopping Game ◽  
Zero Sum

We consider a monotone case of the non-zero-sum stopping game with discrete time parameter which is called the Dynkin problem. Marner (1987) has investigated a stopping game with general monotone reward structures, but his monotonicity is too strong to apply our problem. We establish that there exists an explicit equilibrium point in our monotone case. We also give a simple example applicable to a duopolistic exit game.

On a discrete-time non-zero-sum Dynkin problem with monotonicity

1991 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 466-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Ohtsubo
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Time Parameter ◽  
Stopping Game ◽  
Zero Sum

We consider a monotone case of the non-zero-sum stopping game with discrete time parameter which is called the Dynkin problem. Marner (1987) has investigated a stopping game with general monotone reward structures, but his monotonicity is too strong to apply our problem. We establish that there exists an explicit equilibrium point in our monotone case. We also give a simple example applicable to a duopolistic exit game.

scholarly journals Dynkin Games with Incomplete and Asymmetric Information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiziano De Angelis ◽  
Erik Ekström ◽  
Kristoffer Glover
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Variational Inequalities ◽  
Optimal Stopping ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Stopping Times ◽  
Dynkin Games ◽  
Stopping Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Informational Advantage

We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian setup, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player (incomplete information feature), but known to the other one (asymmetric information feature). We formulate the problem and reduce it to a fully Markovian setup where the uninformed player optimises over stopping times and the informed one uses randomised stopping times in order to hide their informational advantage. Then we provide a general verification result that allows us to find the value of the game and players’ optimal strategies by solving suitable quasi-variational inequalities with some nonstandard constraints. Finally, we study an example with linear payoffs, in which an explicit solution of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities can be obtained.

Why do people believe in a zero-sum economy?

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel G. B. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Everyday Experience ◽  
Coalitional Psychology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Zero Sum

AbstractZero-sum thinking and aversion to trade pervade our society, yet fly in the face of everyday experience and the consensus of economists. Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) evolutionary model invokes coalitional psychology to explain these puzzling intuitions. I raise several empirical challenges to this explanation, proposing two alternative mechanisms – intuitive mercantilism (assigning value to money rather than goods) and errors in perspective-taking.

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