A logic program for transforming sequent proofs to natural deduction proofs

2006 ◽  
pp. 157-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Felty
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Logic Program

Stable and Supported Semantics in Continuous Vector Spaces

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaniv Aspis ◽  
Krysia Broda ◽  
Alessandra Russo ◽  
Jorge Lobo
Keyword(s):  
Logic Program ◽  
Matrix Multiplication ◽  
Vector Spaces ◽  
Continuous Space ◽  
Continuous Vector ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Gradient Based ◽  
Normal Logic ◽  
Parameter Values ◽  
Normal Logic Program

We introduce a novel approach for the computation of stable and supported models of normal logic programs in continuous vector spaces by a gradient-based search method. Specifically, the application of the immediate consequence operator of a program reduct can be computed in a vector space. To do this, Herbrand interpretations of a propositional program are embedded as 0-1 vectors in $\mathbb{R}^N$ and program reducts are represented as matrices in $\mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$. Using these representations we prove that the underlying semantics of a normal logic program is captured through matrix multiplication and a differentiable operation. As supported and stable models of a normal logic program can now be seen as fixed points in a continuous space, non-monotonic deduction can be performed using an optimisation process such as Newton's method. We report the results of several experiments using synthetically generated programs that demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and highlight how different parameter values can affect the behaviour of the system.

Suppose and Tell

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Deduction Rules ◽  
Psychological Sense

The book argues that our use of conditionals is governed by imperfectly reliable heuristics, in the psychological sense of fast and frugal (or quick and dirty) ways of assessing them. The primary heuristic is this: to assess ‘If A, C’, suppose A and on that basis assess C; whatever attitude you take to C conditionally on A (such as acceptance, rejection, or something in between) take unconditionally to ‘If A, C’. This heuristic yields both the equation of the probability of ‘If A, C’ with the conditional probability of C on A and standard natural deduction rules for the conditional. However, these results can be shown to make the heuristic implicitly inconsistent, and so less than fully reliable. There is also a secondary heuristic: pass conditionals freely from one context to another under normal conditions for acceptance of sentences on the basis of memory and testimony. The effect of the secondary heuristic is to undermine interpretations on which ‘if’ introduces a special kind of context-sensitivity. On the interpretation which makes best sense of the two heuristics, ‘if’ is simply the truth-functional conditional. Apparent counterexamples to truth-functionality are artefacts of reliance on the primary heuristic in cases where it is unreliable. The second half of the book concerns counterfactual conditionals, as expressed with ‘if’ and ‘would’. It argues that ‘would’ is an independently meaningful modal operator for contextually restricted necessity: the meaning of counterfactuals is simply that derived compositionally from the meanings of their constituents, including ‘if’ and ‘would’, making them contextually restricted strict conditionals.

Y-Logic: A Framework for Reasoning About Chameleonic Programs with Inconsistent Completions

1990 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-483
Author(s):  
V.S. Subrahmanian
Keyword(s):  
Classical Logic ◽  
Logic Program ◽  
Logic Programs ◽  
Large Subset ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Traditional Sense

Large logic programs are normally designed by teams of individuals, each of whom designs a subprogram. While each of these subprograms may have consistent completions, the logic program obtained by taking the union of these subprograms may not. However, the resulting program still serves a useful purpose, for a (possibly) very large subset of it still has a consistent completion. We argue that “small” inconsistencies may cause a logic program to have no models (in the traditional sense), even though it still serves some useful purpose. A semantics is developed in this paper for general logic programs which ascribes a very reasonable meaning to general logic programs irrespective of whether they have consistent (in the classical logic sense) completions.

TRANSLATIONS BETWEEN LINEAR AND TREE NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEMS FOR RELEVANT LOGICS

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
SHAWN STANDEFER
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relevant Logics

Abstract Anderson and Belnap presented indexed Fitch-style natural deduction systems for the relevant logics R, E, and T. This work was extended by Brady to cover a range of relevant logics. In this paper I present indexed tree natural deduction systems for the Anderson–Belnap–Brady systems and show how to translate proofs in one format into proofs in the other, which establishes the adequacy of the tree systems.

scholarly journals On Polymorphic Sessions and Functions

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Bernardo Toninho ◽  
Nobuko Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Sequent Calculus ◽  
Linear Logic ◽  
Linear Formulation ◽  
Session Types ◽  
Logical Foundation ◽  
Π Calculus ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
System F ◽  
Algebraic Representations

This work exploits the logical foundation of session types to determine what kind of type discipline for the Λ-calculus can exactly capture, and is captured by, Λ-calculus behaviours. Leveraging the proof theoretic content of the soundness and completeness of sequent calculus and natural deduction presentations of linear logic, we develop the first mutually inverse and fully abstract processes-as-functions and functions-as-processes encodings between a polymorphic session π-calculus and a linear formulation of System F. We are then able to derive results of the session calculus from the theory of the Λ-calculus: (1) we obtain a characterisation of inductive and coinductive session types via their algebraic representations in System F; and (2) we extend our results to account for value and process passing, entailing strong normalisation.

scholarly journals Special issue on ‘Program development’

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 423-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAURICE BRUYNOOGHE ◽  
KUNG-KIU LAU
Keyword(s):  
Software Engineering ◽  
Program Development ◽  
Real World ◽  
Development Process ◽  
Logic Program ◽  
Future Challenge ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Logical Foundations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Specification Synthesis

This special issue marks the tenth anniversary of the LOPSTR workshop. LOPSTR started in 1991 as a workshop on Logic Program Synthesis and Transformation, but later it broadened its scope to logic-based Program Development in general.The motivating force behind LOPSTR has been a belief that declarative paradigms such as logic programming are better suited to program development tasks than traditional non-declarative ones such as the imperative paradigm. Specification, synthesis, transformation or specialisation, analysis, verification and debugging can all be given logical foundations, thus providing a unifying framework for the whole development process.In the past ten years or so, such a theoretical framework has indeed begun to emerge. Even tools have been implemented for analysis, verification and specialisation. However, it is fair to say that so far the focus has largely been on programming-in-the-small. So the future challenge is to apply or extend these techniques to programming-in-the-large, in order to tackle software engineering in the real world.

ON THE NOTION OF CANONICAL DERIVATIONS FROM OPEN ASSUMPTIONS AND ITS ROLE IN PROOF-THEORETIC SEMANTICS

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
NISSIM FRANCEZ
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Proof System ◽  
Logical Constants ◽  
Local Completeness ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe paper proposes an extension of the definition of a canonical proof, central to proof-theoretic semantics, to a definition of a canonical derivation from open assumptions. The impact of the extension on the definition of (reified) proof-theoretic meaning of logical constants is discussed. The extended definition also sheds light on a puzzle regarding the definition of local-completeness of a natural-deduction proof-system, underlying its harmony.

AN INTENSIONAL LEIBNIZ SEMANTICS FOR ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAUS GLASHOFF
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Aristotelian Logic ◽  
Categorical Logic ◽  
Characteristic Numbers ◽  
Formal Syntax ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
Classical Philosophy

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document