Belief dynamics, abduction, and databases

Author(s):  
Chandrabose Aravindan ◽  
Phan Minh Dung
Keyword(s):  
1974 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter A. Armbruster
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (176) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirta Galesic ◽  
Henrik Olsson ◽  
Jonas Dalege ◽  
Tamara van der Does ◽  
Daniel L. Stein

Belief change and spread have been studied in many disciplines—from psychology, sociology, economics and philosophy, to biology, computer science and statistical physics—but we still do not have a firm grasp on why some beliefs change more easily and spread faster than others. To fully capture the complex social-cognitive system that gives rise to belief dynamics, we first review insights about structural components and processes of belief dynamics studied within different disciplines. We then outline a unifying quantitative framework that enables theoretical and empirical comparisons of different belief dynamic models. This framework uses a statistical physics formalism, grounded in cognitive and social theory, as well as empirical observations. We show how this framework can be used to integrate extant knowledge and develop a more comprehensive understanding of belief dynamics.


2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. HERZIG ◽  
D. LONGIN
Keyword(s):  

1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1352-1370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Martin ◽  
Daniel Osherson

AbstractScientific inquiry is represented as a process of rational hypothesis revision in the face of data. For the concept of rationality, we rely on the theory of belief dynamics as developed in [5, 9]. Among other things, it is shown that if belief states are left unclosed under deductive logic then scientific theories can be expanded in a uniform, consistent fashion that allows inquiry to proceed by any method of hypothesis revision based on “kernel” contraction. In contrast, if belief states are closed under logic, then no such expansion is possible.


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