On deductive planning and the frame problem

The Frame Problem in Ethics

Philosophical Discourses ◽

10.16926/pd.2020.02.04 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2 ◽

pp. 53-73

Author(s):

Sebastian Gałecki

Keyword(s):

Artificial Intelligence ◽

Moral Judgment ◽

First Principles ◽

Practical Reasoning ◽

Ethical Principles ◽

Frame Problem ◽

Classical Philosophy ◽

The Frame Problem ◽

The Invisible

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.

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What role do the emotions play in cognition?

Consciousness & Emotion ◽

10.1075/ce.4.1.06meg ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 81-100 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Jason L. Megill

Keyword(s):

Face Recognition ◽

Selective Attention ◽

Research Program ◽

Affective Computing ◽

Higher Order ◽

Brain Disorders ◽

Frame Problem ◽

Cognitive Theories ◽

The Frame Problem ◽

The Way

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.

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