Game-theoretic modelling in the dynamic pricing of electricity

2005 ◽  
pp. 78-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jukka Ruusunen ◽  
Raimo P. Hämäläinen ◽  
Mika Räsänen
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Game Theoretic

scholarly journals Incentive compatible demand response games for distributed load prediction in smart grids

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
W. Sabrina Lin ◽  
Feng Han ◽  
Yu-Han Yang ◽  
Zoltan Safar ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Demand Response ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Smart Grids ◽  
Demand Curve ◽  
Load Prediction ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Distributed Load ◽  
Power Substation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Response Scheme

While demand response has achieved promising results on making the power grid more efficient and reliable, the additional dynamics and flexibility brought by demand response also increase the uncertainty and complexity of the centralized load forecast. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic demand response scheme that can transform the traditional centralized load prediction structure into a distributed load prediction system by the participation of customers. Moreover, since customers are generally rational and thus naturally selfish, they may cheat if cheating can improve their payoff. Therefore, enforcing truth-telling is crucial. We prove analytically and demonstrate with simulations that the proposed game-theoretic scheme is incentive compatible, i.e., all customers are motivated to report and consume their true optimal demands and any deviation will lead to a utility loss. We also prove theoretically that the proposed demand response scheme can lead to the solution that maximizes social welfare and is proportionally fair in terms of utility function. Moreover, we propose a simple dynamic pricing algorithm for the power substation to control the total demand of all customers to meet the target demand curve. Finally, simulations are shown to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic algorithm.

scholarly journals Price Increasing Timing of Competitive Perishable Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Wensi Zhang ◽  
Jinlin Li ◽  
Lun Ran
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Perishable Products ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Time Point

AbstractDynamic pricing has been proven to be an effective tool to increase revenue in many industries. We discuss the optimal time point to increase price of perishable products under duopoly competition in revenue management. We propose a game-theoretic model to describe the price increasing timing problem of competitive perishable products in the same market. By solving this problem, we show the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium point and Cournot equilibrium point when choosing the optimal price switching time. To illustrate our results, we also present a numerical example. Our results are applicable for decision makers to determine the optimal time to stop discounting.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Influential individuals: Approach to modeling

2018 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
O. Yu. Bondarenko
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Expert Knowledge ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Leader Influence ◽  
Learning Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Asymmetric Interactions ◽  
Influential Individuals

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.

Dynamic Pricing bei strategischem Konsumentenverhalten

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 292-297
Author(s):  
Jochen Gönsch ◽  
Michael Neugebauer ◽  
Claudius Steinhardt
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Pricing
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