Trade-Offs in the Labor Union-CEO Compensation Relationship

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Banning ◽  
Ted Chiles
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Labor Union ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Compensation Relationship

Green developmentalism and trade-offs between natural preservation and environmental exploitation in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 688-705
Author(s):  
Dong-Li Hong ◽  
Shiuh-Shen Chien ◽  
Yu-Kai Liao
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Yangtze River ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Underground Water ◽  
Cloud Water ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Use Of Technology ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Career Incentives ◽  
Compensation Relationship

China is transitioning from the pursuit of growth at any cost to a stage in which the costs of growth and environmental sustainability have become a consideration. Career incentives for local government officials require them to simultaneously meet stringent targets for economic growth and environmental protection, but these goals are frequently in conflict. Against this backdrop, officials differentiate environment resources into two kinds: privileged and marginal, exploiting the latter to preserve the former. This ‘green self-contradiction’ is generated by two trade-offs: restriction–substitution relationship at the local level and supplement–compensation relationship at the national (trans-local) level. This trade-off framework is examined through two empirical cases: (1) a provincial policy of preservation of plain farmlands along with urbanization of outskirt hills in highland cities like Kunming and Yannan, and (2) a national scheme of stabilization for underground water in the Greater Beijing Region along with exploitation of cloud water from the distant Yangtze River provinces. We argue that these trade-offs embody the Chinese government’s ideological use of technology to preserve certain ‘green’ goals while maintaining a foundational ‘developmentalist’ logic, which we call ‘green developmentalism’.

Novel players fine-tune plant trade-offs

2015 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 83-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selena Gimenez-Ibanez ◽  
Marta Boter ◽  
Roberto Solano
Keyword(s):  
Ubiquitin Ligase ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
Molecular Level ◽  
26S Proteasome ◽  
Signalling Molecules ◽  
Transcriptional Reprogramming ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Jaz Proteins ◽  
Regulatory Feedback Loop ◽  
Fine Tune

Jasmonates (JAs) are essential signalling molecules that co-ordinate the plant response to biotic and abiotic challenges, as well as co-ordinating several developmental processes. Huge progress has been made over the last decade in understanding the components and mechanisms that govern JA perception and signalling. The bioactive form of the hormone, (+)-7-iso-jasmonyl-l-isoleucine (JA-Ile), is perceived by the COI1–JAZ co-receptor complex. JASMONATE ZIM DOMAIN (JAZ) proteins also act as direct repressors of transcriptional activators such as MYC2. In the emerging picture of JA-Ile perception and signalling, COI1 operates as an E3 ubiquitin ligase that upon binding of JA-Ile targets JAZ repressors for degradation by the 26S proteasome, thereby derepressing transcription factors such as MYC2, which in turn activate JA-Ile-dependent transcriptional reprogramming. It is noteworthy that MYCs and different spliced variants of the JAZ proteins are involved in a negative regulatory feedback loop, which suggests a model that rapidly turns the transcriptional JA-Ile responses on and off and thereby avoids a detrimental overactivation of the pathway. This chapter highlights the most recent advances in our understanding of JA-Ile signalling, focusing on the latest repertoire of new targets of JAZ proteins to control different sets of JA-Ile-mediated responses, novel mechanisms of negative regulation of JA-Ile signalling, and hormonal cross-talk at the molecular level that ultimately determines plant adaptability and survival.

Dual Goals for Speed and Accuracy on the Same Performance Task

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olive Emil Wetter ◽  
Jürgen Wegge ◽  
Klaus Jonas ◽  
Klaus-Helmut Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Memory Scanning ◽  
Performance Task ◽  
Performance Tasks ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Test Experiment ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
New Finding ◽  
Sternberg Paradigm ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
Speed And Accuracy

In most work contexts, several performance goals coexist, and conflicts between them and trade-offs can occur. Our paper is the first to contrast a dual goal for speed and accuracy with a single goal for speed on the same task. The Sternberg paradigm (Experiment 1, n = 57) and the d2 test (Experiment 2, n = 19) were used as performance tasks. Speed measures and errors revealed in both experiments that dual as well as single goals increase performance by enhancing memory scanning. However, the single speed goal triggered a speed-accuracy trade-off, favoring speed over accuracy, whereas this was not the case with the dual goal. In difficult trials, dual goals slowed down scanning processes again so that errors could be prevented. This new finding is particularly relevant for security domains, where both aspects have to be managed simultaneously.

Traits and trade-offs are insufficient for evolutionary personality psychology.

2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (9) ◽  
pp. 1073-1074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kennon M. Sheldon ◽  
Melanie S. Sheldon ◽  
Charles P. Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Trade Offs

Trade-offs Between Economic and Social Goals

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poonam Arora ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
David Hardisty ◽  
Nicole Peterson ◽  
Kavita Reddy
Keyword(s):  
Social Goals ◽  
Trade Offs

Trade-offs for equitable climate policy assessed

Nature ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 588 (7837) ◽  
pp. 225-226
Author(s):  
Wei Peng
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
Trade Offs

A Political Economy Model of a Research University

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Research University ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Optimal Incentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

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