Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reese M. Heitner
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Chinese Room

Looking to the Future

2019 ◽  
pp. 254-263
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Inorganic Matter ◽  
The Future

This chapter considers the question of whether or not nonliving systems can acquire consciousness. It explores contemporary advances in technology, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. The chapter also considers whether or not consciousness can be performed if inorganic matter replaced the components with which organisms experience consciousness. These and similar questions on nonhuman intelligence and consciousness are fleshed out with scenarios and thought experiments proposed throughout the 20th century, such as John Searle’s Chinese room argument and the archangel paradigm proposed by C. D. Broad. The chapter concludes with reflections on the human being’s inability to truly experience consciousness in the same way as nonhumans.

Chinese room argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Van Gulick
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Strong Ai

John Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ argument aims to refute ‘strong AI’ (artificial intelligence), the view that instantiating a computer program is sufficient for having contentful mental states. Imagine a program that produces conversationally appropriate Chinese responses to Chinese utterances. Suppose Searle, who understands no Chinese, sits in a room and is passed slips of paper bearing strings of shapes which, unbeknown to him, are Chinese sentences. Searle performs the formal manipulations of the program and passes back slips bearing conversationally appropriate Chinese responses. Searle seems to instantiate the program, but understands no Chinese. So, Searle concludes, strong AI is false.

scholarly journals Chinese room and program identity

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-39
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
The Other ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Strong Conclusion ◽  
Famous Argument ◽  
Present Argument

The Chinese room argument is famous argument introduced by John Searle, in which Searle presented various problems with the claim that it is possible for the artificial intelligence to have understanding of a language in a way in which intelligent beings such as humans have that capacity. The argument was influential enough to, in decades following it, sparke numerous responses and critiques, along with a few alleged improvements to it from Searle. In this article, I will analyze one atypical critique of Searle?s argument, made by Mark Sprevak. Sprevak, unlike the other critics of the argument, agrees with Searle that understanding does not exist in Chinese room in any way, but he claims that Chinese room cannot execute every possible program, like Searle claims. Because of that, Searle cannot conclude the strong conclusion he wants from The Chinese room argument. In this article, I will analyze Searle?s argument, I will give a brief overview of typical responses to it, and I will analyze Sprevak?s response. In the last section, I will present argument that shows that Sprevak, if he wants to keep his conclusions, must either give up one part of his response, or accept one of the typical responses to Searle?s argument, thus making his own response dependent on the response from others.

scholarly journals On J. Searle’s “Chinese Room” from the Hybrid Model of the Artificial Cognitive Agents Design

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 30-47
Author(s):  
Roman V. Dushkin
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Comprehensive Treatment ◽  
Cognitive Agent ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Cognitive Agents ◽  
Strong Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Holistic Theory

The article presents a review of the phenomenon of understanding the meaning of the natural language and, more broadly, the meaning of the situation in which the cognitive agent is located, considering the context. A specific definition of understanding is given, which is at the intersection of neurophysiology, information theory and cybernetics. The scheme of an abstract architecture of the cognitive agent (of arbitrary nature) is offered, which states that an agent with such architecture can understand in the sense described in the paper. It also provides a critique of J. Searle’s mental experiment “The Chinese Room” from the point of view of the construction of artificial cognitive agents within a hybrid paradigm of artificial intelligence. The novelty of the presented work is based on the application of the author’s methodological approach to the construction of artificial cognitive agents. It not only considers the perception of external stimuli from the environment, but also the philosophical problem of “understanding” by the artificial cognitive agent of its sensory inputs. The relevance of the work follows from the renewed interest of the scientific community in the theme of Strong Artificial Intelligence (or AGI). The author's contribution consists in comprehensive treatment from different points of view of the theme of understanding perceived by artificial cognitive agents. It involves the formation of prerequisites for the development of new models and the theory of understanding within the framework of artificial intelligence, which in the future will help to build a holistic theory of the nature of human mind. The article will be interesting for specialists working in the field of artificial intellectual systems and cognitive agents construction, as well as for scientists from other scientific fields – first of all, philosophy, neurophysiology and psychology.

Mind in the World

1970 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-204
Author(s):  
Jan Regner
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Real World ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
The Real ◽  
The World

As the title of my article can indicate, the primary aim of this „brief introduction" is to present the concept of intentionality of one of the world's leading philosophers - John R. Searle. Searle is known for his severe criticism of the dominant traditions in the study of mind, both materialist and dualist, and we may also recall his familiar argument called „the Chinese Room" against theories of „artificial intelligence". The concept of intentionality was founded when philosophers attempted to describe and solve the philosophical problem of specific „quasi-relations" between consciousness and objects and the direction of our mind or language to the real world. I am referring to situations in which we say for instance: „A thinks about p", "B maintains that g", „X asks question if y" and so on.

scholarly journals Conocimiento de los computadores: análisis de programas clásicos

1970 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Mª Martín Martín
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Chinese Room

RESUMENLa inteligencia artificial (AI) se suele definir como el estudio de cómo programar ordenadores que sean capaces de llevar a cabo aquellas cosas que la mente puede hacer. En este estudio vamos a centrarnos en los programas clásicos de inteligencia artificial y trataremos de ver qué tipo de conocimiento poseen los ordenadores, si lo poseen.PALABRAS CLAVEINTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL-CONOCIMIENTO ARTIFICIAL-HABITACIÓN CHINAABSTRACTArtificial intelligence (AI) is somtiemes defined as the study of how to program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. In this study we are going to focus on classic artificial intelligence programs and we will try to determine what kind of knowledge computers have, if any.KEYWORDSARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-ARTIFICIAL KNOWLEDGE- CHINESE ROOM

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