Paleoproductivity records for the past 30 ka in the southern Nansha area, the South China Sea

2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (13) ◽  
pp. 1227-1230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dianyong Fang ◽  
Zhimin Jian ◽  
Pinxian Wang
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past

Weakening of the Kuroshio Intrusion into the South China Sea over the Past Two Decades

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (20) ◽  
pp. 8097-8110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Nan ◽  
Huijie Xue ◽  
Fei Chai ◽  
Dongxiao Wang ◽  
Fei Yu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
Luzon Strait ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
Negative Trend ◽  
Kuroshio Intrusion ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Kuroshio

Abstract Inferred from the satellite and in situ hydrographic data from the 1990s and 2000s, the Kuroshio intrusion into the South China Sea (SCS) had a weakening trend over the past two decades. Associated with the weakened Kuroshio intrusion, the Kuroshio loop and eddy activity southwest of Taiwan became weaker, whereas the water above the salinity minimum became less saline in the northern SCS. The sea surface height southwest of Taiwan increased at a slower rate compared to other regions of the SCS because of the weakened Kuroshio intrusion. Simulations using the Regional Ocean Modeling System (ROMS) Pacific model show that the strength of the Kuroshio intrusion into the SCS decreased from 1993 to 2010 with a negative trend, −0.24 sverdrups (Sv) yr−1 (1 Sv ≡ 106 m3 s−1), in the total Luzon Strait transport (LST). Although wind-induced Ekman transport through the Luzon Strait became weaker, the magnitude at 0.001 Sv yr−1 was too small to compensate for the negative trend of the LST. On the other hand, the piling up of the water induced by monsoon winds was an important mechanism for changing the pressure gradient across the Luzon Strait and eventually affecting the LST. The sea level gradient between the western Pacific and the SCS had a negative trend, −0.10 cm yr−1, corresponding to a negative trend in the geostrophic transport at −0.20 Sv yr−1. The Kuroshio transport east of Luzon Island also had a negative trend, which might also be linked to the weakening Kuroshio intrusion.

U-series dating of dead Porites corals in the South China sea: Evidence for episodic coral mortality over the past two centuries

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ke-Fu Yu ◽  
Jian-Xin Zhao ◽  
Qi Shi ◽  
Te-Gu Chen ◽  
Pin-Xian Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
Coral Mortality ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past

scholarly journals High-resolution UK37temperature reconstructions in the South China Sea over the past 220 kyr

1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carles Pelejero ◽  
Joan O. Grimalt ◽  
Stephanie Heilig ◽  
Markus Kienast ◽  
Luejiang Wang
Keyword(s):  
High Resolution ◽  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past

scholarly journals Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Eryan Ramadhani
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past ◽  
Policy Decision Making

China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has drawn international attention, especially in the past decade. Yet China has not always resorted to assertive foreign policy. Efforts to de-escalate tension are evident despite the domestic preference for tougher action. This study centres on a question: what makes for China’s assertiveness. I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy originates in leaders’ domestic consideration. Utilizing audience costs theory I focus on two assumptions that need to be relaxed: unitary domestic audiences and consistency in leaders’ crisis behaviour. China’s non-unitary domestic audiences, namely the elites and public, have different interests, although they share support for assertiveness in the South China Sea. Domestic audiences can tolerate inconsistency insofar as leaders are able to justify their decision, that is, to de-escalate the South China Sea disputes without dropping assertiveness. Foreign policy decision-making in China remains somewhat opaque, but domestic audiences can influence the process albeit not directly. In this regard, China’s assertiveness serves to generate audience costs so as to underpin regime legitimacy.

China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests

1992 ◽  
Vol 132 ◽  
pp. 999-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Garver
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Strong Base ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past ◽  
Paracel Islands

Over the past decade a highly significant development has attracted little scholarly attention: the steady expansion of Chinese power in the South China Sea. There were several excellent studies of this process through the very early 1980s, but these ended well before China's push from the Paracel Islands to the Spratly Islands in 1988. Indeed, they disagreed about whether China would actually do this. By the early 1990s China had pushed into the Spratlys and built up a relatively strong base there. It is thus time to look anew at China's activities in that region.

Pleistocene paleoceanography of the South China Sea: Progress over the past 20years

2014 ◽  
Vol 352 ◽  
pp. 381-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pinxian Wang ◽  
Qianyu Li ◽  
Jun Tian
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
The Past
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