State power, state embeddedness, and national development in less developed countries: A cross-national analysis

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 66-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-Chang Tsai
1992 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Fiala

The primary goal of the present study is to use cross-national data on labor-force structure to examine the manner in which the international system shapes the character of national development, and the consequences of variation in development strategy for the growth and distribution of national income. A complementary goal is to illustrate the use of residual plots to overcome the “black box” character of cross-national studies, and thereby provide a bridge to case-study research. Multivariate analyses and residual plots provide results congruent with both world-political-economy and developmental perspectives, and indicate that the world economy may be used by lesser developed countries to obtain more rapid and equitable economic growth, although this was not a natural outcome of the world economy in the 1960s and 1970s.


2008 ◽  
pp. 142-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Kentor ◽  
Edward Kick

After the “peace bonus” era, global military expenditures have escalated sharply despite some worldwide declines in military personnel. Theories on the economic impacts of the military institution and escalated military spending greatly differ and include arguments that they either improve domestic economic performance or crowd out growth-inducing processes. Empirical findings on this matter are inconclusive, in part due to a failure to disentangle the various dimensions of military expenditures. We further suggest that modern sociology's relative inattention to such issues has contributed to these shortcomings. We explore a new dimension of military spending that clarifies this issue—military expenditures per soldier —which captures the capital intensiveness of a country’s military organization. Our cross-national panel regression and causal analyses of developed and less developed countries from 1990 to 2003 show that military expenditures per soldier inhibit the growth of per capita GDP, net of control variables, with the most pronounced effects in least developed countries. These expenditures inhibit national development in part by slowing the expansion of the labor force. Labor-intensive militaries may provide a pathway for upward mobility, but comparatively capital-intensive military organizations limit entry opportunities for unskilled and under- or unemployed people. Deep investments in military hardware also reduce the investment capital available for more economically productive opportunities. We also find that arms imports have a positive effect on economic growth, but only in less developed countries.


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