Public expenditure and the optimal commodity tax structure

1987 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 88-89
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Dalton
Keyword(s):  
Public Expenditure ◽  
Tax Structure ◽  
Commodity Tax ◽  
Optimal Commodity

scholarly journals Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Boadway ◽  
Motohiro Sato
Keyword(s):  
Informal Sector ◽  
Production Efficiency ◽  
Intermediate Goods ◽  
Formal Sector ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Commodity Tax ◽  
The Government ◽  
Optimal Commodity ◽  
Tax Design

An optimal commodity tax approach is taken to compare trade taxes and VATs when some commodities are produced informally. Trade taxes apply to all imports and exports, including intermediate goods, while the VAT applies only to sales by the formal sector and imports. The VAT achieves production efficiency within the formal sector, but, unlike trade taxes, cannot indirectly tax profits. Making the size of the informal sector endogenous in each regime is potentially decisive. The ability of the government to change the size of the informal sector through costly enforcement may also tip the balance in favor of the VAT. (JEL E26, H21, H25)

Tax Structure and Bureaucratic Bargaining

1983 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Hunter
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Public Expenditure ◽  
Tax Structure ◽  
Public Budget ◽  
The Public ◽  
Bureaucratic Control ◽  
Public Bureaucracy

This article explores some limitations on the power of the public bureaucracies to control public sector budgets. Two conditions are considered within a majority rule election framework. First, individuals may react to the potential loss of income resulting from a bureaucratically chosen output of public goods. Second, bureaucratic control of the public budget is constrained by the existing tax structure. The model demonstrates that the bureaucratic ability to set public expenditure levels has been seriously overestimated. Further, the model raises questions as to the role of the median voter in elections when the agenda is controlled by a public bureaucracy.

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