A note on the value of zero-sum sequential repeated games with incomplete information

1979 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 217-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Sorin
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Zero Sum

Book Reviews

2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 678-679
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Professor Emeritus ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Hebrew University ◽  
University College London ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The University ◽  
Two Sides

Martin W. Cripps of University College London reviews “Repeated Games”, by Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, and Shmuel Zamir. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents the content of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (Université Catholique de Louvain) discussion papers 9420, 9421, and 9422 and published as Repeated Games in 1994. Discusses basic results on normal form games; basic results on extensive form games; the belief space; a general model of repeated games; full information on one side; incomplete information on two sides; stochastic games; extensions and further results; and non-zero-sum games with incomplete information. Includes an additional appendix discussing further developments.” The late Mertens was a Professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain. Sorin is with the Mathematics Department at the Université Pierre et Marie Curie. Zamir is Professor Emeritus and a founding member of the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Professor of Economics at the University of Exeter Business School.

Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 1650017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Sandomirskaia
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finite Limit ◽  
Discussion Paper ◽  
Price Fluctuations ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Multistage Bidding

We consider the repeated zero-sum bidding game with incomplete information on one side with non-normalized total payoff. De Meyer and Marino [(2005) Continuous versus discrete market game, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1535] and Domansky and Kreps [(2005) Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets, Proc. Appl. Ind. Math. 12(4), 950–952 (in Russian)] investigated a game [Formula: see text] modeling multistage bidding with asymmetrically informed agents and proved that for this game [Formula: see text] converges to a finite limit [Formula: see text], i.e., the error term is [Formula: see text]. In this paper, we show that for this example [Formula: see text] converges to the limit exponentially fast. For this purpose we apply the optimal strategy [Formula: see text] of insider in the infinite-stage game obtained by Domansky [(2007) Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets, Int. J. Game Theor. 36(2), 241–257] to the [Formula: see text]-stage game and deduce that it is [Formula: see text]-optimal with [Formula: see text] exponentially small.

Non-Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information

2015 ◽  
pp. 481-510
Author(s):  
Jean-Francois Mertens ◽  
Sylvain Sorin ◽  
Shmuel Zamir
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Zero Sum
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